42 ideas
4568 | If 'Queen of England' does not refer if there is no queen, its meaning can't refer if there is one [Cooper,DE] |
12154 | Are 'word token' and 'word type' different sorts of countable objects, or two ways of counting? [Geach, by Perry] |
10735 | Abstraction from objects won't reveal an operation's being performed 'so many times' [Geach] |
4574 | If some peoples do not have categories like time or cause, they can't be essential features of rationality [Cooper,DE] |
16643 | Accidents always remain suited to a subject [Bonaventura] |
8780 | Attributes are functions, not objects; this distinguishes 'square of 2' from 'double of 2' [Geach] |
8969 | We should abandon absolute identity, confining it to within some category [Geach, by Hawthorne] |
16696 | Successive things reduce to permanent things [Bonaventura] |
16075 | Denial of absolute identity has drastic implications for logic, semantics and set theory [Wasserman on Geach] |
12152 | Identity is relative. One must not say things are 'the same', but 'the same A as' [Geach] |
16073 | Leibniz's Law is incomplete, since it includes a non-relativized identity predicate [Geach, by Wasserman] |
11910 | Being 'the same' is meaningless, unless we specify 'the same X' [Geach] |
4573 | If it is claimed that language correlates with culture, we must be able to identify the two independently [Cooper,DE] |
4575 | A person's language doesn't prove their concepts, but how are concepts deduced apart from language? [Cooper,DE] |
8775 | A big flea is a small animal, so 'big' and 'small' cannot be acquired by abstraction [Geach] |
8776 | We cannot learn relations by abstraction, because their converse must be learned too [Geach] |
10732 | If concepts are just recognitional, then general judgements would be impossible [Geach] |
4561 | Many sentences set up dispositions which are irrelevant to the meanings of the sentences [Cooper,DE] |
2567 | You can't define real mental states in terms of behaviour that never happens [Geach] |
2568 | Beliefs aren't tied to particular behaviours [Geach] |
8781 | The mind does not lift concepts from experience; it creates them, and then applies them [Geach] |
10731 | For abstractionists, concepts are capacities to recognise recurrent features of the world [Geach] |
8769 | If someone has aphasia but can still play chess, they clearly have concepts [Geach] |
8770 | 'Abstractionism' is acquiring a concept by picking out one experience amongst a group [Geach] |
8771 | 'Or' and 'not' are not to be found in the sensible world, or even in the world of inner experience [Geach] |
8772 | We can't acquire number-concepts by extracting the number from the things being counted [Geach] |
8773 | Abstractionists can't explain counting, because it must precede experience of objects [Geach] |
8774 | The numbers don't exist in nature, so they cannot have been abstracted from there into our languages [Geach] |
8778 | Blind people can use colour words like 'red' perfectly intelligently [Geach] |
8777 | If 'black' and 'cat' can be used in the absence of such objects, how can such usage be abstracted? [Geach] |
8779 | We can form two different abstract concepts that apply to a single unified experience [Geach] |
10733 | The abstractionist cannot explain 'some' and 'not' [Geach] |
10734 | Only a judgement can distinguish 'striking' from 'being struck' [Geach] |
4564 | I can meaningfully speculate that humans may have experiences currently impossible for us [Cooper,DE] |
4565 | The verification principle itself seems neither analytic nor verifiable [Cooper,DE] |
4562 | Most people know how to use the word "Amen", but they do not know what it means [Cooper,DE] |
4563 | 'How now brown cow?' is used for elocution, but this says nothing about its meaning [Cooper,DE] |
4566 | Any thesis about reference is also a thesis about what exists to be referred to [Cooper,DE] |
4571 | Reference need not be a hit-or-miss affair [Cooper,DE] |
4572 | If predicates name things, that reduces every sentence to a mere list of names [Cooper,DE] |
4576 | An analytic truth is one which becomes a logical truth when some synonyms have been replaced [Cooper,DE] |
22489 | 'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot] |