Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Bonaventura, Francis Bacon and Robert Kirk

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


37 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophy is like a statue which is worshipped but never advances [Bacon]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is the best knowledge, because it is the simplest [Bacon]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Natural history supports physical knowledge, which supports metaphysical knowledge [Bacon]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Physics studies transitory matter; metaphysics what is abstracted and necessary [Bacon]
Physics is of material and efficient causes, metaphysics of formal and final causes [Bacon]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
A weaker kind of reductionism than direct translation is the use of 'bridge laws' [Kirk,R]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
Accidents always remain suited to a subject [Bonaventura]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
Only individual bodies exist [Bacon]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / c. Form as causal
In hylomorphism all the explanation of actions is in the form, and the matter doesn't do anything [Bacon]
There are only individual bodies containing law-based powers, and the Forms are these laws [Bacon]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 6. Successive Things
Successive things reduce to permanent things [Bonaventura]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
The senses deceive, but also show their own errors [Bacon]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
We don't assume there is no land, because we can only see sea [Bacon]
Empiricists are collecting ants; rationalists are spinning spiders; and bees do both [Bacon]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
Science moves up and down between inventions of causes, and experiments [Bacon]
Nature is revealed when we put it under pressure rather than observe it [Bacon]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
Science must clear away the idols of the mind if they are ever going to find the truth [Bacon]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
Many different theories will fit the observed facts [Bacon]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
Maybe we should see intentionality and consciousness as a single problem, not two [Kirk,R]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
If a bird captures a worm, we could say its behaviour is 'about' the worm [Kirk,R]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Behaviourism says intentionality is an external relation; language of thought says it's internal [Kirk,R]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
People love (unfortunately) extreme generality, rather than particular knowledge [Bacon]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
Dualism implies some brain events with no physical cause, and others with no physical effect [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 1. Behaviourism
Behaviourism seems a good theory for intentional states, but bad for phenomenal ones [Kirk,R]
Behaviourism offers a good alternative to simplistic unitary accounts of mental relationships [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
In 'holistic' behaviourism we say a mental state is a complex of many dispositions [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
The inverted spectrum idea is often regarded as an objection to behaviourism [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
All meaningful psychological statements can be translated into physics [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
Instead of representation by sentences, it can be by a distribution of connectionist strengths [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
If mental states are multiply realisable, they could not be translated into physical terms [Kirk,R]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
It seems unlikely that most concepts are innate, if a theory must be understood to grasp them [Kirk,R]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
For behaviourists language is just a special kind of behaviour [Kirk,R]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Behaviourists doubt whether reference is a single type of relation [Kirk,R]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
Teleological accounts are fine in metaphysics, but they stop us from searching for the causes [Bacon]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
Stripped and passive matter is just a human invention [Bacon]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Essences are part of first philosophy, but as part of nature, not part of logic [Bacon]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
Even without religion, there are many guides to morality [Bacon]