Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Bonaventura, Keith Donnellan and Francis of Marchia

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11 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
Russell only uses descriptions attributively, and Strawson only referentially [Donnellan, by Lycan]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
A definite description can have a non-referential use [Donnellan]
Definite descriptions are 'attributive' if they say something about x, and 'referential' if they pick x out [Donnellan]
'The x is F' only presumes that x exists; it does not actually entail the existence [Donnellan]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
Accidents always remain suited to a subject [Bonaventura]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
If you remove the accidents from a horse and a lion, the intellect can't tell them apart [Francis of Marchia]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 6. Successive Things
Successive things reduce to permanent things [Bonaventura]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
A definite description 'the F' is referential if the speaker could thereby be referring to something not-F [Donnellan, by Sainsbury]
Donnellan is unclear whether the referential-attributive distinction is semantic or pragmatic [Bach on Donnellan]
A description can successfully refer, even if its application to the subject is not believed [Donnellan]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
Whether a definite description is referential or attributive depends on the speaker's intention [Donnellan]