Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Bonaventura, Wilfrid Hodges and Harry G. Frankfurt

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41 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
10476 The idea that groups of concepts could be 'implicitly defined' was abandoned [Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
10282 Logic is the study of sound argument, or of certain artificial languages (or applying the latter to the former) [Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
10478 Since first-order languages are complete, |= and |- have the same meaning [Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
10477 |= in model-theory means 'logical consequence' - it holds in all models [Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
10283 A formula needs an 'interpretation' of its constants, and a 'valuation' of its variables [Hodges,W]
10284 There are three different standard presentations of semantics [Hodges,W]
10285 I |= φ means that the formula φ is true in the interpretation I [Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
10474 |= should be read as 'is a model for' or 'satisfies' [Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
10473 Model theory studies formal or natural language-interpretation using set-theory [Hodges,W]
10475 A 'structure' is an interpretation specifying objects and classes of quantification [Hodges,W]
10481 Models in model theory are structures, not sets of descriptions [Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
10288 Down Löwenheim-Skolem: if a countable language has a consistent theory, that has a countable model [Hodges,W]
10289 Up Löwenheim-Skolem: if infinite models, then arbitrarily large models [Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
10287 If a first-order theory entails a sentence, there is a finite subset of the theory which entails it [Hodges,W]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / i. Cardinal infinity
10480 First-order logic can't discriminate between one infinite cardinal and another [Hodges,W]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
10286 A 'set' is a mathematically well-behaved class [Hodges,W]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
16643 Accidents always remain suited to a subject [Bonaventura]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 6. Successive Things
16696 Successive things reduce to permanent things [Bonaventura]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 9. Normative Necessity
9240 Love creates a necessity concerning what to care about [Frankfurt]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
9264 Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt]
9266 A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
9267 Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
9265 The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
20015 Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
9228 Ranking order of desires reveals nothing, because none of them may be considered important [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
9270 A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt]
9269 A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
9238 Morality isn't based on reason; moral indignation is quite unlike disapproval of irrationality [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
9232 It is by caring about things that we infuse the world with importance [Frankfurt]
9234 If you don't care about at least one thing, you can't find reasons to care about anything [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
9229 What is worthwhile for its own sake alone may be worth very little [Frankfurt]
9233 Our criteria for evaluating how to live offer an answer to the problem [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
9235 Rather than loving things because we value them, I think we value things because we love them [Frankfurt]
9236 Love can be cool, and it may not involve liking its object [Frankfurt]
9237 The paradigm case of pure love is not romantic, but that between parents and infants [Frankfurt]
9239 I value my children for their sake, but I also value my love for them for its own sake [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
9227 We might not choose a very moral life, if the character or constitution was deficient [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
9230 People want to fulfill their desires, but also for their desires to be sustained [Frankfurt]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
9241 Loving oneself is not a failing, but is essential to a successful life [Frankfurt]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
9300 Boredom is serious, not just uncomfortable; it threatens our psychic survival [Frankfurt]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
9231 Freedom needs autonomy (rather than causal independence) - embracing our own desires and choices [Frankfurt]