Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Brad W. Hooker, Democritus (attrib) and David Roochnik

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46 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
You have to be a Platonist to debate about reality, so every philosopher is a Platonist [Roochnik]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
Philosophy aims to satisfy the chief human desire - the articulation of beauty itself [Roochnik]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
'Logos' ranges from thought/reasoning, to words, to rational structures outside thought [Roochnik]
In the seventeenth century the only acceptable form of logos was technical knowledge [Roochnik]
The hallmark of a person with logos is that they give reasons why one opinion is superior to another [Roochnik]
Logos cannot refute the relativist, and so must admit that it too is a matter of desire (for truth and agreement) [Roochnik]
Human desire has an ordered structure, with logos at the pinnacle [Roochnik]
Logos is not unconditionally good, but good if there is another person willing to engage with it [Roochnik]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
We prefer reason or poetry according to whether basics are intelligible or not [Roochnik]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Reason is a more powerful persuader than gold [Democritus (attr)]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
Modern science, by aiming for clarity about the external world, has abandoned rationality in the human world [Roochnik]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Attempts to suspend all presuppositions are hopeless, because a common ground must be agreed for the process [Roochnik]
Unfortunately for reason, argument can't be used to establish the value of argument [Roochnik]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Reality can be viewed neutrally, or as an object of desire [Roochnik]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Relativism is a disease which destroys the possibility of rational debate [Roochnik]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
If relativism is the correct account of human values, then rhetoric is more important than reasoning [Roochnik]
Reasoning aims not at the understanding of objects, but at the desire to give beautiful speeches [Roochnik]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Beauty is merely animal without intelligence [Democritus (attr)]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Behave well when alone, and feel shame in you own eyes [Democritus (attr)]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
Prescriptivism says 'ought' without commitment to act is insincere, or weakly used [Hooker,B]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / d. Health
Good breeding in men means having a good character [Democritus (attr)]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Virtuous love consists of decorous desire for the beautiful [Democritus (attr)]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
Good and true are the same for everyone, but pleasures differ [Democritus (attr)]
We should only choose pleasures which are concerned with the beautiful [Democritus (attr)]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
Only accept beneficial pleasures [Democritus (attr)]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
The great pleasures come from the contemplation of noble works [Democritus (attr)]
Moderation brings more pleasures, and so increases pleasure [Democritus (attr)]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Immoderate desire is the mark of a child, not an adult [Democritus (attr)]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
It is as brave to master pleasure as to overcome the enemy [Democritus (attr)]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
Universal moral judgements imply the Golden Rule ('do as you would be done by') [Hooker,B]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
A bad life is just a drawn-out death [Democritus (attr)]
Be virtuous from duty, not from fear [Democritus (attr)]
Virtue doesn't just avoid evil, but also doesn't desire it [Democritus (attr)]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Repentance of shameful deeds is salvation [Democritus (attr)]
Virtue comes more from practice than from nature [Democritus (attr)]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / i. Absolute virtues
One must avoid even speaking of evil deeds [Democritus (attr)]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
The wrongdoer is more unfortunate than the person wronged [Democritus (attr)]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
Small appetite makes poverty equal to wealth [Democritus (attr)]
The endless desire for money is a crueller slavery than poverty [Democritus (attr)]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
It is better to have one intelligent friend than many unintelligent [Democritus (attr)]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
It is a great thing, when one is in adversity, to think of duty [Democritus (attr)]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 2. Ideal of Pleasure
Modern utilitarians value knowledge, friendship, autonomy, and achievement, as well as pleasure [Hooker,B]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 5. Rule Utilitarianism
Rule-utilitarians prevent things like torture, even on rare occasions when it seems best [Hooker,B]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
It is better to be poor in a democracy than be rich without freedom [Democritus (attr)]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 2. Euthanasia
Euthanasia is active or passive, and voluntary, non-voluntary or involuntary [Hooker,B]
Euthanasia may not involve killing, so it is 'killing or not saving, out of concern for that person' [Hooker,B]