Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Brad W. Hooker, R Kaplan / E Kaplan and Allan Gibbard

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26 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
15717 Using Choice, you can cut up a small ball and make an enormous one from the pieces [Kaplan/Kaplan]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
15712 1 and 0, then add for naturals, subtract for negatives, divide for rationals, take roots for irrationals [Kaplan/Kaplan]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
15711 The rationals are everywhere - the irrationals are everywhere else [Kaplan/Kaplan]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
15714 'Commutative' laws say order makes no difference; 'associative' laws say groupings make no difference [Kaplan/Kaplan]
15715 'Distributive' laws say if you add then multiply, or multiply then add, you get the same result [Kaplan/Kaplan]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
14064 If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent [Gibbard]
14066 A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay [Gibbard]
14067 Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about [Gibbard]
14069 We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay' [Gibbard]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
14076 Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition [Gibbard]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14077 Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts [Gibbard]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
14070 A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it [Gibbard]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
14073 Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law [Gibbard]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
14065 Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times [Gibbard]
14074 Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
14072 Possible worlds identity needs a sortal [Gibbard]
14078 Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds [Gibbard]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
14079 Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential [Gibbard]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
15713 The first million numbers confirm that no number is greater than a million [Kaplan/Kaplan]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
14071 Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria [Gibbard]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
2854 Prescriptivism says 'ought' without commitment to act is insincere, or weakly used [Hooker,B]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
2856 Universal moral judgements imply the Golden Rule ('do as you would be done by') [Hooker,B]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 2. Ideal of Pleasure
20883 Modern utilitarians value knowledge, friendship, autonomy, and achievement, as well as pleasure [Hooker,B]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 5. Rule Utilitarianism
20884 Rule-utilitarians prevent things like torture, even on rare occasions when it seems best [Hooker,B]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 2. Euthanasia
20885 Euthanasia is active or passive, and voluntary, non-voluntary or involuntary [Hooker,B]
20882 Euthanasia may not involve killing, so it is 'killing or not saving, out of concern for that person' [Hooker,B]