28 ideas
13966 | Analytic philosophy loved the necessary a priori analytic, linguistic modality, and rigour [Soames] |
13974 | If philosophy is analysis of meaning, available to all competent speakers, what's left for philosophers? [Soames] |
15163 | The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism [Soames] |
17879 | Axiomatising set theory makes it all relative [Skolem] |
13536 | Skolem did not believe in the existence of uncountable sets [Skolem] |
15158 | Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position [Soames] |
15157 | Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight [Soames] |
15156 | The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics [Soames] |
17878 | If a 1st-order proposition is satisfied, it is satisfied in a denumerably infinite domain [Skolem] |
17880 | Integers and induction are clear as foundations, but set-theory axioms certainly aren't [Skolem] |
17881 | Mathematician want performable operations, not propositions about objects [Skolem] |
13969 | Kripkean essential properties and relations are necessary, in all genuinely possible worlds [Soames] |
15161 | There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames] |
15162 | We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames] |
13973 | A key achievement of Kripke is showing that important modalities are not linguistic in source [Soames] |
13968 | Kripkean possible worlds are abstract maximal states in which the real world could have been [Soames] |
15152 | To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames] |
15153 | Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames] |
13965 | Semantics as theory of meaning and semantics as truth-based logical consequence are very different [Soames] |
13964 | Semantic content is a proposition made of sentence constituents (not some set of circumstances) [Soames] |
13972 | Two-dimensionalism reinstates descriptivism, and reconnects necessity and apriority to analyticity [Soames] |
15154 | We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames] |
2854 | Prescriptivism says 'ought' without commitment to act is insincere, or weakly used [Hooker,B] |
2856 | Universal moral judgements imply the Golden Rule ('do as you would be done by') [Hooker,B] |
20883 | Modern utilitarians value knowledge, friendship, autonomy, and achievement, as well as pleasure [Hooker,B] |
20884 | Rule-utilitarians prevent things like torture, even on rare occasions when it seems best [Hooker,B] |
20885 | Euthanasia is active or passive, and voluntary, non-voluntary or involuntary [Hooker,B] |
20882 | Euthanasia may not involve killing, so it is 'killing or not saving, out of concern for that person' [Hooker,B] |