44 ideas
| 10468 | A metaphysics has an ontology (objects) and an ideology (expressed ideas about them) [Oliver] |
| 2764 | Full coherence might involve consistency and mutual entailment of all propositions [Blanshard, by Dancy,J] |
| 10471 | Ockham's Razor has more content if it says believe only in what is causal [Oliver] |
| 18776 | Contextual definitions eliminate descriptions from contexts [Linsky,B] |
| 21704 | 'Impredictative' definitions fix a class in terms of the greater class to which it belongs [Linsky,B] |
| 10749 | Necessary truths seem to all have the same truth-maker [Oliver] |
| 10750 | Slingshot Argument: seems to prove that all sentences have the same truth-maker [Oliver] |
| 19080 | Coherence tests for truth without implying correspondence, so truth is not correspondence [Blanshard, by Young,JO] |
| 21705 | Reducibility says any impredicative function has an appropriate predicative replacement [Linsky,B] |
| 18774 | Definite descriptions, unlike proper names, have a logical structure [Linsky,B] |
| 21727 | Definite descriptions theory eliminates the King of France, but not the Queen of England [Linsky,B] |
| 21719 | Extensionalism means what is true of a function is true of coextensive functions [Linsky,B] |
| 21723 | The task of logicism was to define by logic the concepts 'number', 'successor' and '0' [Linsky,B] |
| 21721 | Higher types are needed to distinguished intensional phenomena which are coextensive [Linsky,B] |
| 21703 | Types are 'ramified' when there are further differences between the type of quantifier and its range [Linsky,B] |
| 21714 | The ramified theory subdivides each type, according to the range of the variables [Linsky,B] |
| 21713 | Did logicism fail, when Russell added three nonlogical axioms, to save mathematics? [Linsky,B] |
| 21715 | For those who abandon logicism, standard set theory is a rival option [Linsky,B] |
| 10747 | Accepting properties by ontological commitment tells you very little about them [Oliver] |
| 10748 | Reference is not the only way for a predicate to have ontological commitment [Oliver] |
| 10719 | There are four conditions defining the relations between particulars and properties [Oliver] |
| 10721 | If properties are sui generis, are they abstract or concrete? [Oliver] |
| 10716 | There are just as many properties as the laws require [Oliver] |
| 10720 | We have four options, depending whether particulars and properties are sui generis or constructions [Oliver] |
| 10714 | The expressions with properties as their meanings are predicates and abstract singular terms [Oliver] |
| 10715 | There are five main semantic theories for properties [Oliver] |
| 21729 | Construct properties as sets of objects, or say an object must be in the set to have the property [Linsky,B] |
| 10738 | Tropes are not properties, since they can't be instantiated twice [Oliver] |
| 10739 | The property of redness is the maximal set of the tropes of exactly similar redness [Oliver] |
| 10740 | The orthodox view does not allow for uninstantiated tropes [Oliver] |
| 10741 | Maybe concrete particulars are mereological wholes of abstract particulars [Oliver] |
| 10742 | Tropes can overlap, and shouldn't be splittable into parts [Oliver] |
| 10472 | 'Structural universals' methane and butane are made of the same universals, carbon and hydrogen [Oliver] |
| 10724 | Located universals are wholly present in many places, and two can be in the same place [Oliver] |
| 7963 | Aristotle's instantiated universals cannot account for properties of abstract objects [Oliver] |
| 10730 | If universals ground similarities, what about uniquely instantiated universals? [Oliver] |
| 10727 | Uninstantiated universals seem to exist if they themselves have properties [Oliver] |
| 7962 | Uninstantiated properties are useful in philosophy [Oliver] |
| 10722 | Instantiation is set-membership [Oliver] |
| 10744 | Nominalism can reject abstractions, or universals, or sets [Oliver] |
| 10726 | Things can't be fusions of universals, because two things could then be one thing [Oliver] |
| 10725 | Abstract sets of universals can't be bundled to make concrete things [Oliver] |
| 10745 | Science is modally committed, to disposition, causation and law [Oliver] |
| 10746 | Conceptual priority is barely intelligible [Oliver] |