38 ideas
| 17713 | After 1903, Husserl avoids metaphysical commitments [Mares] |
| 2764 | Full coherence might involve consistency and mutual entailment of all propositions [Blanshard, by Dancy,J] |
| 18781 | Inconsistency doesn't prevent us reasoning about some system [Mares] |
| 19080 | Coherence tests for truth without implying correspondence, so truth is not correspondence [Blanshard, by Young,JO] |
| 18789 | Intuitionist logic looks best as natural deduction [Mares] |
| 18790 | Intuitionism as natural deduction has no rule for negation [Mares] |
| 18787 | Three-valued logic is useful for a theory of presupposition [Mares] |
| 18793 | Material implication (and classical logic) considers nothing but truth values for implications [Mares] |
| 18784 | In classical logic the connectives can be related elegantly, as in De Morgan's laws [Mares] |
| 18780 | Standard disjunction and negation force us to accept the principle of bivalence [Mares] |
| 18786 | Excluded middle standardly implies bivalence; attacks use non-contradiction, De M 3, or double negation [Mares] |
| 18782 | The connectives are studied either through model theory or through proof theory [Mares] |
| 7306 | If the only property of a name was its reference, we couldn't explain bearerless names [Miller,A] |
| 18783 | Many-valued logics lack a natural deduction system [Mares] |
| 18792 | Situation semantics for logics: not possible worlds, but information in situations [Mares] |
| 18785 | Consistency is semantic, but non-contradiction is syntactic [Mares] |
| 17715 | The truth of the axioms doesn't matter for pure mathematics, but it does for applied [Mares] |
| 17716 | Mathematics is relations between properties we abstract from experience [Mares] |
| 18788 | For intuitionists there are not numbers and sets, but processes of counting and collecting [Mares] |
| 17703 | Light in straight lines is contingent a priori; stipulated as straight, because they happen to be so [Mares] |
| 17714 | Aristotelians dislike the idea of a priori judgements from pure reason [Mares] |
| 17705 | Empiricists say rationalists mistake imaginative powers for modal insights [Mares] |
| 17700 | The most popular view is that coherent beliefs explain one another [Mares] |
| 7322 | Constitutive scepticism is about facts, and epistemological scepticism about our ability to know them [Miller,A] |
| 17704 | Operationalism defines concepts by our ways of measuring them [Mares] |
| 7325 | Dispositions say what we will do, not what we ought to do, so can't explain normativity [Miller,A] |
| 17710 | Aristotelian justification uses concepts abstracted from experience [Mares] |
| 17706 | The essence of a concept is either its definition or its conceptual relations? [Mares] |
| 7324 | Explain meaning by propositional attitudes, or vice versa, or together? [Miller,A] |
| 18791 | In 'situation semantics' our main concepts are abstracted from situations [Mares] |
| 7323 | If truth is deflationary, sentence truth-conditions just need good declarative syntax [Miller,A] |
| 17701 | Possible worlds semantics has a nice compositional account of modal statements [Mares] |
| 17702 | Unstructured propositions are sets of possible worlds; structured ones have components [Mares] |
| 7315 | 'Jones is a married bachelor' does not have the logical form of a contradiction [Miller,A] |
| 7328 | The principle of charity is holistic, saying we must hold most of someone's system of beliefs to be true [Miller,A] |
| 7329 | Maybe we should interpret speakers as intelligible, rather than speaking truth [Miller,A] |
| 7333 | The Frege-Geach problem is that I can discuss the wrongness of murder without disapproval [Miller,A] |
| 17708 | Maybe space has points, but processes always need regions with a size [Mares] |