53 ideas
7973 | There is no longer anything on which there is nothing to say [Baudrillard] |
6841 | Some continental philosophers are relativists - Baudrillard, for example [Baudrillard, by Critchley] |
7975 | The task of philosophy is to unmask the illusion of objective reality [Baudrillard] |
2764 | Full coherence might involve consistency and mutual entailment of all propositions [Blanshard, by Dancy,J] |
7986 | Drunken boat pilots are less likely to collide than clearly focused ones [Baudrillard] |
7982 | Instead of thesis and antithesis leading to synthesis, they now cancel out, and the conflict is levelled [Baudrillard] |
18889 | Ostensive definitions needn't involve pointing, but must refer to something specific [Salmon,N] |
19080 | Coherence tests for truth without implying correspondence, so truth is not correspondence [Blanshard, by Young,JO] |
14684 | A world is 'accessible' to another iff the first is possible according to the second [Salmon,N] |
14669 | For metaphysics, T may be the only correct system of modal logic [Salmon,N] |
14667 | System B has not been justified as fallacy-free for reasoning on what might have been [Salmon,N] |
14668 | In B it seems logically possible to have both p true and p is necessarily possibly false [Salmon,N] |
14692 | System B implies that possibly-being-realized is an essential property of the world [Salmon,N] |
14671 | What is necessary is not always necessarily necessary, so S4 is fallacious [Salmon,N] |
14627 | S4, and therefore S5, are invalid for metaphysical modality [Salmon,N, by Williamson] |
14686 | S5 modal logic ignores accessibility altogether [Salmon,N] |
14691 | S5 believers say that-things-might-have-been-that-way is essential to ways things might have been [Salmon,N] |
14693 | The unsatisfactory counterpart-theory allows the retention of S5 [Salmon,N] |
14670 | Metaphysical (alethic) modal logic concerns simple necessity and possibility (not physical, epistemic..) [Salmon,N] |
7974 | Without God we faced reality: what do we face without reality? [Baudrillard] |
7987 | Nothing is true, but everything is exact [Baudrillard] |
14742 | It can't be indeterminate whether x and y are identical; if x,y is indeterminate, then it isn't x,x [Salmon,N] |
18888 | Essentialism says some properties must be possessed, if a thing is to exist [Salmon,N] |
14678 | Any property is attached to anything in some possible world, so I am a radical anti-essentialist [Salmon,N] |
14680 | Logical possibility contains metaphysical possibility, which contains nomological possibility [Salmon,N] |
14690 | In the S5 account, nested modalities may be unseen, but they are still there [Salmon,N] |
14677 | Metaphysical necessity is said to be unrestricted necessity, true in every world whatsoever [Salmon,N] |
14679 | Bizarre identities are logically but not metaphysically possible, so metaphysical modality is restricted [Salmon,N] |
14688 | Without impossible worlds, the unrestricted modality that is metaphysical has S5 logic [Salmon,N] |
14685 | Metaphysical necessity is NOT truth in all (unrestricted) worlds; necessity comes first, and is restricted [Salmon,N] |
14681 | Logical necessity is free of constraints, and may accommodate all of S5 logic [Salmon,N] |
14676 | Nomological necessity is expressed with intransitive relations in modal semantics [Salmon,N] |
14689 | Necessity and possibility are not just necessity and possibility according to the actual world [Salmon,N] |
14674 | Impossible worlds are also ways for things to be [Salmon,N] |
14682 | Denial of impossible worlds involves two different confusions [Salmon,N] |
14687 | Without impossible worlds, how things might have been is the only way for things to be [Salmon,N] |
14683 | Possible worlds rely on what might have been, so they can' be used to define or analyse modality [Salmon,N] |
14672 | Possible worlds are maximal abstract ways that things might have been [Salmon,N] |
14675 | Possible worlds just have to be 'maximal', but they don't have to be consistent [Salmon,N] |
14673 | You can't define worlds as sets of propositions, and then define propositions using worlds [Salmon,N] |
7978 | There is no need to involve the idea of free will to make choices about one's life [Baudrillard] |
18886 | Frege's 'sense' solves four tricky puzzles [Salmon,N] |
18887 | The perfect case of direct reference is a variable which has been assigned a value [Salmon,N] |
18885 | Kripke and Putnam made false claims that direct reference implies essentialism [Salmon,N] |
7980 | In modern times, being useless is the essential aesthetic ingredient for an object [Baudrillard] |
7983 | Good versus evil has been banefully reduced to happiness versus misfortune [Baudrillard] |
7981 | Whole populations are terrorist threats to authorities, who unite against them [Baudrillard] |
7976 | People like democracy because it means they can avoid power [Baudrillard] |
7977 | Only in the last 200 years have people demanded the democratic privilege of being individuals [Baudrillard] |
7979 | The arrival of the news media brought history to an end [Baudrillard] |
7984 | Suicide is ascribed to depression, with the originality of the act of will ignored [Baudrillard] |
18891 | Nothing in the direct theory of reference blocks anti-essentialism; water structure might have been different [Salmon,N] |
7985 | Pascal says secular life is acceptable, but more fun with the hypothesis of God [Baudrillard] |