104 ideas
| 7113 | Phenomenology assumes that all consciousness is of something [Sartre] |
| 2764 | Full coherence might involve consistency and mutual entailment of all propositions [Blanshard, by Dancy,J] |
| 19080 | Coherence tests for truth without implying correspondence, so truth is not correspondence [Blanshard, by Young,JO] |
| 4098 | The theory of descriptions supports internalism, since they are thinkable when the object is non-existent [Crane] |
| 22227 | For Sartre there is only being for-itself, or being in-itself (which is beyond experience) [Sartre, by Daigle] |
| 4077 | Aesthetic properties of thing supervene on their physical properties [Crane] |
| 4078 | Constitution (as in a statue constituted by its marble) is supervenience without identity [Crane] |
| 8386 | Events are picked out by descriptions, and facts by whole sentences [Crane] |
| 4082 | The distinction between 'resultant' properties (weight) and 'emergent' properties is a bit vague [Crane] |
| 4083 | If mental properties are emergent they add a new type of causation, and physics is not complete [Crane] |
| 4079 | Properties are causes [Crane] |
| 4068 | Traditional substance is separate from properties and capable of independent existence [Crane] |
| 4096 | Maybe beliefs don't need to be conscious, if you are not conscious of the beliefs guiding your actions [Crane] |
| 4097 | Maybe there are two kinds of belief - 'de re' beliefs and 'de dicto' beliefs [Crane] |
| 4093 | Many cases of knowing how can be expressed in propositional terms (like how to get somewhere) [Crane] |
| 7112 | The Cogito depends on a second-order experience, of being conscious of consciousness [Sartre] |
| 7114 | The consciousness that says 'I think' is not the consciousness that thinks [Sartre] |
| 7119 | Is the Cogito reporting an immediate experience of doubting, or the whole enterprise of doubting? [Sartre] |
| 20743 | Appearances do not hide the essence; appearances are the essence [Sartre] |
| 4108 | Phenol-thio-urea tastes bitter to three-quarters of people, but to the rest it is tasteless, so which is it? [Crane] |
| 4105 | The traditional supports for the sense datum theory were seeing double and specks before one's eyes [Crane] |
| 4104 | One can taste that the wine is sour, and one can also taste the sourness of the wine [Crane] |
| 4101 | If we smell something we are aware of the smell separately, but we don't perceive a 'look' when we see [Crane] |
| 4102 | The problems of perception disappear if it is a relation to an intentional state, not to an object or sense datum [Crane] |
| 4109 | If perception is much richer than our powers of description, this suggests that it is non-conceptual [Crane] |
| 4103 | The adverbial theory of perceptions says it is the experiences which have properties, not the objects [Crane] |
| 4065 | Is knowledge just a state of mind, or does it also involve the existence of external things? [Crane] |
| 7125 | A consciousness can conceive of no other consciousness than itself [Sartre] |
| 7122 | We can never, even in principle, grasp other minds, because the Ego is self-conceiving [Sartre] |
| 7108 | The eternal truth of 2+2=4 is what gives unity to the mind which regularly thinks it [Sartre] |
| 24016 | Consciousness always transcends itself [Sartre] |
| 6151 | Sartre says consciousness is just directedness towards external objects [Sartre, by Rowlands] |
| 4092 | The core of the consciousness problem is the case of Mary, zombies, and the Hard Question [Crane] |
| 7111 | Consciousness exists as consciousness of itself [Sartre] |
| 22226 | Since we are a consciousness, Sartre entirely rejected the unconscious mind [Sartre, by Daigle] |
| 7107 | Intentionality defines, transcends and unites consciousness [Sartre] |
| 4087 | Intentionalism does not require that all mental states be propositional attitudes [Crane] |
| 4095 | Object-directed attitudes like love are just as significant as propositional attitudes [Crane] |
| 4106 | If someone removes their glasses the content of experience remains, but the quality changes [Crane] |
| 4089 | Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object [Crane] |
| 4090 | Weak intentionalism says qualia are extra properties; strong intentionalism says they are intentional [Crane] |
| 4107 | With inverted qualia a person's experiences would change, but their beliefs remain the same [Crane] |
| 3847 | Man is nothing else but the sum of his actions [Sartre] |
| 7109 | If you think of '2+2=4' as the content of thought, the self must be united transcendentally [Sartre] |
| 7106 | The Ego is not formally or materially part of consciousness, but is outside in the world [Sartre] |
| 7117 | How could two I's, the reflective and the reflected, communicate with each other? [Sartre] |
| 7123 | Knowing yourself requires an exterior viewpoint, which is necessarily false [Sartre] |
| 22225 | My ego is more intimate to me, but not more certain than other egos [Sartre] |
| 7124 | The Ego never appears except when we are not looking for it [Sartre] |
| 7116 | When we are unreflective (as when chasing a tram) there is no 'I' [Sartre] |
| 7120 | It is theoretically possible that the Ego consists entirely of false memories [Sartre] |
| 7110 | If the 'I' is transcendental, it unnecessarily splits consciousness in two [Sartre] |
| 7115 | Maybe it is the act of reflection that brings 'me' into existence [Sartre] |
| 7121 | The Ego only appears to reflection, so it is cut off from the World [Sartre] |
| 3846 | Man IS freedom [Sartre] |
| 4069 | Descartes did not think of minds as made of a substance, because they are not divisible [Crane] |
| 4074 | Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism [Crane] |
| 4091 | The problems of misrepresentation and error have dogged physicalist reductions of intentionality [Crane] |
| 4070 | Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance [Crane] |
| 4084 | Non-reductive physicalism seeks an explanation of supervenience, but emergentists accept it as basic [Crane] |
| 4080 | If mental supervenes on the physical, then every physical cause will be accompanied by a mental one [Crane] |
| 4075 | Identity theory is either of particular events, or of properties, depending on your theory of causation [Crane] |
| 4085 | Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution [Crane] |
| 4073 | Overdetermination occurs if two events cause an effect, when each would have caused it alone [Crane] |
| 4072 | The completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind [Crane] |
| 4094 | Experience teaches us propositions, because we can reason about our phenomenal experience [Crane] |
| 24013 | An emotion and its object form a unity, so emotion is a mode of apprehension [Sartre] |
| 24017 | Emotion is one of our modes of understanding our Being-in-the-World [Sartre] |
| 24014 | Emotions are a sort of bodily incantation which brings a magic to the world [Sartre] |
| 24015 | Emotions makes us believe in and live in a new world [Sartre] |
| 6164 | Sartre rejects mental content, and the idea that the mind has hidden inner features [Sartre, by Rowlands] |
| 4100 | The Twin Earth argument depends on reference being determined by content, which may be false. [Crane] |
| 4067 | Broad content entails the existence of the object of the thought [Crane] |
| 4063 | In intensional contexts, truth depends on how extensions are conceived. [Crane] |
| 6687 | Man is the desire to be God [Sartre] |
| 7074 | Man is a useless passion [Sartre] |
| 3843 | There is no human nature [Sartre] |
| 20762 | There are no values to justify us, and no excuses [Sartre] |
| 3852 | If values depend on us, freedom is the foundation of all values [Sartre] |
| 22228 | Sartre's freedom is not for whimsical action, but taking responsibility for our own values [Sartre, by Daigle] |
| 22233 | Love is the demand to be loved [Sartre] |
| 20764 | In becoming what we want to be we create what we think man ought to be [Sartre] |
| 3848 | Cowards are responsible for their cowardice [Sartre] |
| 20763 | When my personal freedom becomes involved, I must want freedom for everyone else [Sartre] |
| 22229 | Existentialists says that cowards and heroes make themselves [Sartre] |
| 20755 | Fear concerns the world, but 'anguish' comes from confronting my self [Sartre] |
| 3842 | Existence before essence (or begin with the subjective) [Sartre] |
| 6868 | 'Existence precedes essence' means we have no pre-existing self, but create it through existence [Sartre, by Le Poidevin] |
| 3844 | Existentialism says man is whatever he makes of himself [Sartre] |
| 20760 | Sincerity is not authenticity, because it only commits to one particular identity [Sartre, by Aho] |
| 22231 | We flee from the anguish of freedom by seeing ourselves objectively, as determined [Sartre] |
| 20754 | It is dishonest to offer passions as an excuse [Sartre] |
| 22230 | Sartre gradually realised that freedom is curtailed by the weight of situation [Sartre, by Daigle] |
| 22232 | Authenticity is taking responsibility for a situation, with all its risks and emotions [Sartre] |
| 3851 | If I do not choose, that is still a choice [Sartre] |
| 6571 | When a man must choose between his mother and the Resistance, no theory can help [Sartre, by Fogelin] |
| 20491 | States have a monopoly of legitimate violence [Sartre, by Wolff,J] |
| 21240 | The truth about events always comes from the oppressed and disadvantaged [Sartre, by Bakewell] |
| 4071 | Causation can be seen in counterfactual terms, or as increased probability, or as energy flow [Crane] |
| 8387 | A cause has its effects in virtue of its properties [Crane] |
| 4076 | Causes are properties, not events, because properties are what make a difference in a situation [Crane] |
| 8384 | The regularity theory explains a causal event by other items than the two that are involved [Crane] |
| 3845 | Without God there is no intelligibility or value [Sartre] |
| 4066 | It seems that 'exists' could sometimes be a predicate [Crane] |