117 ideas
16227 | Philosophers are good at denying the obvious [Hawley] |
15390 | Metaphysics attempts to give an account of everything, in terms of categories and principles [Simons] |
12865 | Analytic philosophers may prefer formal systems because natural language is such mess [Simons] |
2764 | Full coherence might involve consistency and mutual entailment of all propositions [Blanshard, by Dancy,J] |
19080 | Coherence tests for truth without implying correspondence, so truth is not correspondence [Blanshard, by Young,JO] |
12815 | Classical mereology doesn't apply well to the objects around us [Simons] |
12819 | A 'part' has different meanings for individuals, classes, and masses [Simons] |
12832 | Complement: the rest of the Universe apart from some individual, written x-bar [Simons] |
12834 | Criticisms of mereology: parts? transitivity? sums? identity? four-dimensional? [Simons] |
12827 | Difference: the difference of individuals is the remainder of an overlap, written 'x - y' [Simons] |
12828 | General sum: the sum of objects satisfying some predicate, written σx(Fx) [Simons] |
12822 | Proper or improper part: x < y, 'x is (a) part of y' [Simons] |
12823 | Overlap: two parts overlap iff they have a part in common, expressed as 'x o y' [Simons] |
12824 | Disjoint: two individuals are disjoint iff they do not overlap, written 'x | y' [Simons] |
12825 | Product: the product of two individuals is the sum of all of their overlaps, written 'x · y' [Simons] |
12826 | Sum: the sum of individuals is what is overlapped if either of them are, written 'x + y' [Simons] |
12829 | General product: the nucleus of all objects satisfying a predicate, written πx(Fx) [Simons] |
12830 | Universe: the mereological sum of all objects whatever, written 'U' [Simons] |
12831 | Atom: an individual with no proper parts, written 'At x' [Simons] |
12844 | Dissective: stuff is dissective if parts of the stuff are always the stuff [Simons] |
12816 | Classical mereology doesn't handle temporal or modal notions very well [Simons] |
12821 | The part-relation is transitive and asymmetric (and thus irreflexive) [Simons] |
18847 | Each wheel is part of a car, but the four wheels are not a further part [Simons] |
12813 | Two standard formalisations of part-whole theory are the Calculus of Individuals, and Mereology [Simons] |
12846 | A 'group' is a collection with a condition which constitutes their being united [Simons] |
12861 | 'The wolves' are the matter of 'the pack'; the latter is a group, with different identity conditions [Simons] |
12848 | The same members may form two groups [Simons] |
12876 | Philosophy is stuck on the Fregean view that an individual is anything with a proper name [Simons] |
16216 | Part of the sense of a proper name is a criterion of the thing's identity [Hawley] |
12845 | Some natural languages don't distinguish between singular and plural [Simons] |
12838 | Four-dimensional ontology has no change, since that needs an object, and time to pass [Simons] |
12842 | There are real relational changes, as well as bogus 'Cambridge changes' [Simons] |
12841 | I don't believe in processes [Simons] |
12836 | Fans of process ontology cheat, since river-stages refer to 'rivers' [Simons] |
8979 | Slow and continuous events (like balding or tree-growth) are called 'processes', not 'events' [Simons] |
8981 | Maybe processes behave like stuff-nouns, and events like count-nouns [Simons] |
12880 | Moments are things like smiles or skids, which are founded on other things [Simons] |
12881 | A smiling is an event with causes, but the smile is a continuant without causes [Simons] |
12883 | Moving disturbances are are moments which continuously change their basis [Simons] |
12882 | A wave is maintained by a process, but it isn't a process [Simons] |
12840 | I do not think there is a general identity condition for events [Simons] |
8973 | Einstein's relativity brought events into ontology, as the terms of a simultaneity relationships [Simons] |
12839 | Relativity has an ontology of things and events, not on space-time diagrams [Simons] |
12879 | Independent objects can exist apart, and maybe even entirely alone [Simons] |
16211 | A homogeneous rotating disc should be undetectable according to Humean supervenience [Hawley] |
12863 | Mass terms (unlike plurals) are used with indifference to whether they can exist in units [Simons] |
12847 | Mass nouns admit 'much' and 'a little', and resist 'many' and 'few'. [Simons] |
12862 | Gold is not its atoms, because the atoms must be all gold, but gold contains neutrons [Simons] |
12858 | Mixtures disappear if nearly all of the mixture is one ingredient [Simons] |
12859 | A mixture can have different qualities from its ingredients. [Simons] |
16219 | Non-linguistic things cannot be indeterminate, because they don't have truth-values at all [Hawley] |
16223 | Maybe for the world to be vague, it must be vague in its foundations? [Hawley] |
16226 | Epistemic vagueness seems right in the case of persons [Hawley] |
16208 | Supervaluation refers to one vaguely specified thing, through satisfaction by everything in some range [Hawley] |
16221 | Supervaluationism takes what the truth-value would have been if indecision was resolved [Hawley] |
16230 | Maybe the only properties are basic ones like charge, mass and spin [Hawley] |
18431 | Internal relations combine some tropes into a nucleus, which bears the non-essential tropes [Simons, by Edwards] |
16232 | An object is 'natural' if its stages are linked by certain non-supervenient relations [Hawley] |
12850 | To individuate something we must pick it out, but also know its limits of variation [Simons] |
12860 | Sortal nouns for continuants tell you their continuance- and cessation-conditions [Simons] |
12886 | A whole requires some unique relation which binds together all of the parts [Simons] |
16200 | Are sortals spatially maximal - so no cat part is allowed to be a cat? [Hawley] |
12835 | Does Tibbles remain the same cat when it loses its tail? [Simons] |
12857 | Tibbles isn't Tib-plus-tail, because Tibbles can survive its loss, but the sum can't [Simons] |
16237 | The modal features of statue and lump are disputed; when does it stop being that statue? [Hawley] |
16238 | Perdurantists can adopt counterpart theory, to explain modal differences of identical part-sums [Hawley] |
12820 | Without extensional mereology two objects can occupy the same position [Simons] |
16220 | Vagueness is either in our knowledge, in our talk, or in reality [Hawley] |
16222 | Indeterminacy in objects and in properties are not distinct cases [Hawley] |
12866 | Composition is asymmetric and transitive [Simons] |
16228 | The constitution theory is endurantism plus more than one object in a place [Hawley] |
16229 | Constitution theory needs sortal properties like 'being a sweater' to distinguish it from its thread [Hawley] |
14492 | If the constitution view says thread and sweater are two things, why do we talk of one thing? [Hawley] |
12867 | A hand constitutes a fist (when clenched), but a fist is not composed of an augmented hand [Simons] |
12864 | We say 'b is part of a', 'b is a part of a', 'b are a part of a', or 'b are parts of a'. [Simons] |
12814 | Classical mereology says there are 'sums', for whose existence there is no other evidence [Simons] |
12817 | 'Mereological extensionality' says objects with the same parts are identical [Simons] |
12833 | If there are c atoms, this gives 2^c - 1 individuals, so there can't be just 2 or 12 individuals [Simons] |
12849 | Sums are more plausible for pluralities and masses than they are for individuals [Simons] |
12877 | Sums of things in different categories are found within philosophy. [Simons] |
12888 | The wholeness of a melody seems conventional, but of an explosion it seems natural [Simons] |
12871 | Objects have their essential properties because of the kind of objects they are [Simons] |
12870 | We must distinguish the de dicto 'must' of propositions from the de re 'must' of essence [Simons] |
12873 | Original parts are the best candidates for being essential to artefacts [Simons] |
12874 | An essential part of an essential part is an essential part of the whole [Simons] |
16193 | 'Adverbialism' explains change by saying an object has-at-some-time a given property [Hawley] |
16195 | Presentism solves the change problem: the green banana ceases, so can't 'relate' to the yellow one [Hawley] |
16202 | The problem of change arises if there must be 'identity' of a thing over time [Hawley] |
16192 | Endurance theory can relate properties to times, or timed instantiations to properties [Hawley] |
16196 | Endurance is a sophisticated theory, covering properties, instantiation and time [Hawley] |
16197 | How does perdurance theory explain our concern for our own future selves? [Hawley] |
16191 | Perdurance needs an atemporal perspective, to say that the object 'has' different temporal parts [Hawley] |
16199 | If an object is the sum of all of its temporal parts, its mass is staggeringly large! [Hawley] |
16201 | Perdurance says things are sums of stages; Stage Theory says each stage is the thing [Hawley] |
16240 | If a life is essentially the sum of its temporal parts, it couldn't be shorter or longer than it was? [Hawley] |
12837 | Four dimensional-objects are stranger than most people think [Simons] |
16206 | Stages must be as fine-grained in length as change itself, so any change is a new stage [Hawley] |
16203 | Stage Theory seems to miss out the link between stages of the same object [Hawley] |
16204 | Stage Theory says every stage is a distinct object, which gives too many objects [Hawley] |
16212 | An isolated stage can't be a banana (which involves suitable relations to other stages) [Hawley] |
16213 | Stages of one thing are related by extrinsic counterfactual and causal relations [Hawley] |
16205 | The stages of Stage Theory seem too thin to populate the world, or to be referred to [Hawley] |
12856 | Intermittent objects would be respectable if they occurred in nature, as well as in artefacts [Simons] |
12885 | Objects like chess games, with gaps in them, are thereby less unified [Simons] |
12854 | An entrepreneur and a museum curator would each be happy with their ship at the end [Simons] |
12855 | The 'best candidate' theories mistakenly assume there is one answer to 'Which is the real ship?' [Simons] |
12872 | The zygote is an essential initial part, for a sexually reproduced organism [Simons] |
16225 | If two things might be identical, there can't be something true of one and false of the other [Hawley] |
12889 | The limits of change for an individual depend on the kind of individual [Simons] |
16239 | To decide whether something is a counterpart, we need to specify a relevant sortal concept [Hawley] |
16218 | On any theory of self, it is hard to explain why we should care about our future selves [Hawley] |
18883 | Any equivalence relation among similar things allows the creation of an abstractum [Simons] |
18884 | Abstraction is usually seen as producing universals and numbers, but it can do more [Simons] |
12843 | With activities if you are doing it you've done it, with performances you must finish to have done it [Simons] |
12875 | One false note doesn't make it a performance of a different work [Simons] |
16215 | Causation is nothing more than the counterfactuals it grounds? [Hawley] |
16207 | Time could be discrete (like integers) or dense (rationals) or continuous (reals) [Hawley] |