48 ideas
2764 | Full coherence might involve consistency and mutual entailment of all propositions [Blanshard, by Dancy,J] |
19080 | Coherence tests for truth without implying correspondence, so truth is not correspondence [Blanshard, by Young,JO] |
17518 | Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope [Ayers] |
17516 | If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals? [Ayers] |
17520 | Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers] |
17519 | To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers] |
17510 | Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers] |
17522 | We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers] |
17515 | Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers] |
17511 | Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers] |
17517 | Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers] |
17513 | If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers] |
17523 | Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers] |
17521 | You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers] |
17514 | Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers] |
17509 | Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers] |
17512 | If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers] |
4363 | The word 'person' is useless in ethics, because what counts as a good or bad self-conscious being? [Hursthouse] |
4355 | There may be inverse akrasia, where the agent's action is better than their judgement recommends [Hursthouse] |
4325 | Must all actions be caused in part by a desire, or can a belief on its own be sufficient? [Hursthouse] |
4351 | It is a fantasy that only through the study of philosophy can one become virtuous [Hursthouse] |
4340 | You are not a dishonest person if a tragic dilemma forces you to do something dishonest [Hursthouse] |
4329 | After a moral dilemma is resolved there is still a 'remainder', requiring (say) regret [Hursthouse] |
4330 | Deontologists resolve moral dilemmas by saying the rule conflict is merely apparent [Hursthouse] |
4341 | Involuntary actions performed in tragic dilemmas are bad because they mar a good life [Hursthouse] |
4358 | Virtue may be neither sufficient nor necessary for eudaimonia [Hursthouse] |
4337 | Teenagers are often quite wise about ideals, but rather stupid about consequences [Hursthouse] |
4324 | Animals and plants can 'flourish', but only rational beings can have eudaimonia [Hursthouse] |
4359 | When it comes to bringing up children, most of us think that the virtues are the best bet [Hursthouse] |
20195 | Eudaimonia first; virtue is a trait which promotes it; right acts are what virtues produce [Hursthouse, by Zagzebski] |
4336 | Any strict ranking of virtues or rules gets abandoned when faced with particular cases [Hursthouse] |
4334 | Virtue ethics is open to the objection that it fails to show priority among the virtues [Hursthouse] |
4361 | Good animals can survive, breed, feel characteristic pleasure and pain, and contribute to the group [Hursthouse] |
4349 | Virtuous people may not be fully clear about their reasons for action [Hursthouse] |
4352 | Performing an act simply because it is virtuous is sufficient to be 'morally motivated' or 'dutiful' [Hursthouse] |
4353 | If moral motivation is an all-or-nothing sense of duty, how can children act morally? [Hursthouse] |
4346 | The emotions of sympathy, compassion and love are no guarantee of right action or acting well [Hursthouse] |
4339 | According to virtue ethics, two agents may respond differently, and yet both be right [Hursthouse] |
4354 | Maybe in a deeply poisoned character none of their milder character traits could ever be a virtue [Hursthouse] |
4364 | Being unusually virtuous in some areas may entail being less virtuous in others [Hursthouse] |
4356 | We are puzzled by a person who can show an exceptional virtue and also behave very badly [Hursthouse] |
4327 | Deontologists do consider consequences, because they reveal when a rule might apply [Hursthouse] |
4335 | 'Codifiable' morality give rules for decisions which don't require wisdom [Hursthouse] |
4328 | Preference utilitarianism aims to be completely value-free, or empirical [Hursthouse] |
4343 | We are torn between utilitarian and deontological views of lying, depending on the examples [Hursthouse] |
4338 | Deontologists usually accuse utilitarians of oversimplifying hard cases [Hursthouse] |
4365 | We are distinct from other animals in behaving rationally - pursuing something as good, for reasons [Hursthouse] |
4350 | If people are virtuous in obedience to God, would they become wicked if they lost their faith? [Hursthouse] |