Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Brand Blanshard, Robin F. Hendry and Jonathan Kvanvig

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23 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
2764 Full coherence might involve consistency and mutual entailment of all propositions [Blanshard, by Dancy,J]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
19080 Coherence tests for truth without implying correspondence, so truth is not correspondence [Blanshard, by Young,JO]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
17486 Supervenience is simply modally robust property co-variance [Hendry]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
19566 Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
19261 Understanding is seeing coherent relationships in the relevant information [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
19568 Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
19567 The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
19679 'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues
19730 Epistemic virtues: love of knowledge, courage, caution, autonomy, practical wisdom... [Kvanvig]
19731 If epistemic virtues are faculties or powers, that doesn't explain propositional knowledge [Kvanvig]
19732 The value of good means of attaining truth are swamped by the value of the truth itself [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
19678 Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
19570 Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
17481 Nuclear charge (plus laws) explains electron structure and spectrum, but not vice versa [Hendry]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
17478 Maybe two kinds are the same if there is no change of entropy on isothermal mixing [Hendry]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
17479 The nature of an element must survive chemical change, so it is the nucleus, not the electrons [Hendry]
17484 Maybe the nature of water is macroscopic, and not in the microstructure [Hendry]
17485 Maybe water is the smallest part of it that still counts as water (which is H2O molecules) [Hendry]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
17483 Water continuously changes, with new groupings of molecules [Hendry]
17482 Compounds can differ with the same collection of atoms, so structure matters too [Hendry]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 2. Modern Elements
17476 Elements survive chemical change, and are tracked to explain direction and properties [Hendry]
17477 Defining elements by atomic number allowed atoms of an element to have different masses [Hendry]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 3. Periodic Table
17480 Generally it is nuclear charge (not nuclear mass) which determines behaviour [Hendry]