34 ideas
16974 | The nature of each logical concept is given by a collection of inference rules [Correia] |
14703 | Superficial necessity is true in all worlds; deep necessity is thus true, no matter which world is actual [Schroeter] |
16973 | Explain logical necessity by logical consequence, or the other way around? [Correia] |
14714 | Contradictory claims about a necessary god both seem apriori coherent [Schroeter] |
14704 | 2D semantics gives us apriori knowledge of our own meanings [Schroeter] |
14706 | Your view of water depends on whether you start from the actual Earth or its counterfactual Twin [Schroeter] |
14711 | Rationalists say knowing an expression is identifying its extension using an internal cognitive state [Schroeter] |
14717 | Internalist meaning is about understanding; externalist meaning is about embedding in a situation [Schroeter] |
14720 | Semantic theory assigns meanings to expressions, and metasemantics explains how this works [Schroeter] |
14695 | Semantic theories show how truth of sentences depends on rules for interpreting and joining their parts [Schroeter] |
14696 | Simple semantics assigns extensions to names and to predicates [Schroeter] |
14697 | 'Federer' and 'best tennis player' can't mean the same, despite having the same extension [Schroeter] |
14698 | Possible worlds semantics uses 'intensions' - functions which assign extensions at each world [Schroeter] |
14699 | Possible worlds make 'I' and that person's name synonymous, but they have different meanings [Schroeter] |
14709 | Possible worlds semantics implies a constitutive connection between meanings and modal claims [Schroeter] |
14719 | In the possible worlds account all necessary truths are same (because they all map to the True) [Schroeter] |
14701 | Array worlds along the horizontal, and contexts (world,person,time) along the vertical [Schroeter] |
14702 | If we introduce 'actually' into modal talk, we need possible worlds twice to express this [Schroeter] |
14705 | Do we know apriori how we refer to names and natural kinds, but their modal profiles only a posteriori? [Schroeter] |
14715 | 2D fans defend it for conceptual analysis, for meaning, and for internalist reference [Schroeter] |
14716 | 2D semantics can't respond to contingent apriori claims, since there is no single proposition involved [Schroeter] |
20712 | God is 'eternal' either by being non-temporal, or by enduring forever [Davies,B] |
20701 | Can God be good, if he has not maximised goodness? [Davies,B] |
20702 | The goodness of God may be a higher form than the goodness of moral agents [Davies,B] |
20703 | How could God have obligations? What law could possibly impose them? [Davies,B] |
20694 | 'Natural theology' aims to prove God to anyone (not just believers) by reason or argument [Davies,B] |
20706 | A distinct cause of the universe can't be material (which would be part of the universe) [Davies,B] |
20707 | The universe exhibits design either in its sense of purpose, or in its regularity [Davies,B] |
20708 | If God is an orderly being, he cannot be the explanation of order [Davies,B] |
20710 | Maybe an abnormal state of mind is needed to experience God? [Davies,B] |
20711 | A believer can experience the world as infused with God [Davies,B] |
20709 | The experiences of God are inconsistent, not universal, and untestable [Davies,B] |
20697 | One does not need a full understanding of God in order to speak of God [Davies,B] |
20699 | Paradise would not contain some virtues, such as courage [Davies,B] |