Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Bryan van Norden, Adolph Rami and John Rawls

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43 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 2. Ancient Thought
The Dao (Way) first means the road, and comes to mean the right way to live [Norden]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
The hermeneutic circle is either within the text, or between text and biased reader [Norden]
Heremeneutics is either 'faith' (examining truth) or 'suspicion' (looking for hidden motives) [Norden]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
There are five problems which the truth-maker theory might solve [Rami]
The truth-maker idea is usually justified by its explanatory power, or intuitive appeal [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
Central idea: truths need truthmakers; and possibly all truths have them, and makers entail truths [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
Most theorists say that truth-makers necessitate their truths [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths [Rami]
'Truth supervenes on being' avoids entities as truth-makers for negative truths [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
Truth-making is usually internalist, but the correspondence theory is externalist [Rami]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Correspondence theories assume that truth is a representation relation [Rami]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property [Rami]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
Truth-maker theorists should probably reject the converse Barcan formula [Rami]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
Internal relations depend either on the existence of the relata, or on their properties [Rami]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
The extremes of essentialism are that all properties are essential, or only very trivial ones [Rami]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
An 'individual essence' is possessed uniquely by a particular object [Rami]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
'Sortal essentialism' says being a particular kind is what is essential [Rami]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
Unlosable properties are not the same as essential properties [Rami]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Physical possibility is part of metaphysical possibility which is part of logical possibility [Rami]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 2. Epistemic possibility
If it is possible 'for all I know' then it is 'epistemically possible' [Rami]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Human injustice is not a permanent feature of communities [Rawls]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
Rawls defends the priority of right over good [Rawls, by Finlayson]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
A fair arrangement is one that parties can agree to without knowing how it will benefit them personally [Rawls, by Williams,B]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
Check your rationality by thinking of your opinion pronounced by the supreme court [Rawls]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism inappropriately scales up the individual willingness to make sacrifices [Rawls, by Nagel]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 4. Unfairness
The maximisation of happiness must be done fairly [Rawls, by Smart]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
Rawls rejected cosmopolitanism because it doesn't respect the autonomy of 'peoples' [Rawls, by Shorten]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / a. Original position
Why does the rational agreement of the 'Original Position' in Rawls make it right? [Nagel on Rawls]
The original position models the idea that citizens start as free and equal [Rawls, by Swift]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / b. Veil of ignorance
Choose justice principles in ignorance of your own social situation [Rawls]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / c. Difference principle
All desirable social features should be equal, unless inequality favours the disadvantaged [Rawls]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
Power is only legitimate if it is reasonable for free equal citizens to endorse the constitution [Rawls]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 4. Social Utilitarianism
Utilitarians lump persons together; Rawls somewhat separates them; Nozick wholly separates them [Swift on Rawls]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
Rawls's account of justice relies on conventional fairness, avoiding all moral controversy [Gray on Rawls]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / b. Against communitarianism
In a pluralist society we can't expect a community united around one conception of the good [Rawls]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Liberty Principle: everyone has an equal right to liberties, if compatible with others' liberties [Rawls]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
The social contract has problems with future generations, national boundaries, disabilities and animals [Rawls, by Nussbaum]
Justice concerns not natural distributions, or our born location, but what we do about them [Rawls]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / b. Justice in war
If an aggression is unjust, the constraints on how it is fought are much stricter [Rawls]