Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Buddhaghosa, Tyler Burge and Duncan Pritchard

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28 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
My modus ponens might be your modus tollens [Pritchard,D]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Given that thinking aims at truth, logic gives universal rules for how to do it [Burge]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
We now have a much more sophisticated understanding of logical form in language [Burge]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
We come to believe mathematical propositions via their grounding in the structure [Burge]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
The equivalent algebra model of geometry loses some essential spatial meaning [Burge]
You can't simply convert geometry into algebra, as some spatial content is lost [Burge]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
Peano arithmetic requires grasping 0 as a primitive number [Burge]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
An improbable lottery win can occur in a nearby possible world [Pritchard,D]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
Moore begs the question, or just offers another view, or uses 'know' wrongly [Pritchard,D, by PG]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
Is apriority predicated mainly of truths and proofs, or of human cognition? [Burge]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
We can have evidence for seeing a zebra, but no evidence for what is entailed by that [Pritchard,D]
Favouring: an entailment will give better support for the first belief than reason to deny the second [Pritchard,D]
Maybe knowledge just needs relevant discriminations among contrasting cases [Pritchard,D]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
Epistemic internalism usually says justification must be accessible by reflection [Pritchard,D]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
Externalism is better than internalism in dealing with radical scepticism [Pritchard,D]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / c. Disjunctivism
Disjunctivism says perceptual justification must be both factual and known by the agent [Pritchard,D]
Metaphysical disjunctivism says normal perceptions and hallucinations are different experiences [Pritchard,D]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
Epistemic externalism struggles to capture the idea of epistemic responsibility [Pritchard,D]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
We assess error against background knowledge, but that is just what radical scepticism challenges [Pritchard,D]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Radical scepticism is merely raised, and is not a response to worrying evidence [Pritchard,D]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
Anti-individualism says the environment is involved in the individuation of some mental states [Burge]
Broad concepts suggest an extension of the mind into the environment (less computer-like) [Burge]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Anti-individualism may be incompatible with some sorts of self-knowledge [Burge]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Some qualities of experience, like blurred vision, have no function at all [Burge]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Are meaning and expressed concept the same thing? [Burge, by Segal]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 1. Causing Death
Human killing is worse if the victim is virtuous [Buddhaghosa]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
If there are no finks or antidotes at the fundamental level, the laws can't be ceteris paribus [Burge, by Corry]