25 ideas
18901 | Truthmakers are facts 'of' a domain, not something 'in' the domain [Sommers] |
18904 | 'Predicable' terms come in charged pairs, with one the negation of the other [Sommers, by Engelbretsen] |
18895 | Logic which maps ordinary reasoning must be transparent, and free of variables [Sommers] |
18897 | Predicate logic has to spell out that its identity relation '=' is an equivalent relation [Sommers] |
18893 | Translating into quantificational idiom offers no clues as to how ordinary thinkers reason [Sommers] |
18903 | Sommers promotes the old idea that negation basically refers to terms [Sommers, by Engelbretsen] |
18894 | Predicates form a hierarchy, from the most general, down to names at the bottom [Sommers] |
16039 | Supervenience: No A-difference without a B-difference [Bennett,K] |
16043 | Supervenience is non-symmetric - sometimes it's symmetric, and sometimes it's one-way [Bennett,K] |
16047 | Weak supervenience is in one world, strong supervenience in all possible worlds [Bennett,K] |
16040 | Aesthetics, morality and mind supervene on the physical? Modal on non-modal? General on particular? [Bennett,K] |
16044 | Some entailments do not involve supervenience, as when brotherhood entails siblinghood [Bennett,K] |
16046 | Reduction requires supervenience, but does supervenience suffice for reduction? [Bennett,K] |
18900 | Unfortunately for realists, modern logic cannot say that some fact exists [Sommers] |
16049 | Definitions of physicalism are compatible with a necessary God [Bennett,K] |
13127 | Categories can't overlap; they are either disjoint, or inclusive [Sommers, by Westerhoff] |
14963 | Surely the past phases of a thing are not parts of the thing? [Broad] |
11842 | If short-lived happenings like car crashes are 'events', why not long-lived events like Dover Cliffs? [Broad] |
14759 | A thing is simply a long event, linked by qualities, and spatio-temporal unity [Broad] |
16042 | The metaphysically and logically possible worlds are the same, so they are the same strength [Bennett,K] |
7628 | Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund] |
18898 | In standard logic, names are the only way to refer [Sommers] |
8160 | The present and past exist, but the future does not [Broad, by Dummett] |
14609 | We could say present and past exist, but not future, so that each event adds to the total history [Broad] |
22933 | We imagine the present as a spotlight, moving across events from past to future [Broad] |