Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for C.S. Lewis, Richard M. Hare and R Kaplan / E Kaplan

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27 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
15717 Using Choice, you can cut up a small ball and make an enormous one from the pieces [Kaplan/Kaplan]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
15712 1 and 0, then add for naturals, subtract for negatives, divide for rationals, take roots for irrationals [Kaplan/Kaplan]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
15711 The rationals are everywhere - the irrationals are everywhere else [Kaplan/Kaplan]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
15714 'Commutative' laws say order makes no difference; 'associative' laws say groupings make no difference [Kaplan/Kaplan]
15715 'Distributive' laws say if you add then multiply, or multiply then add, you get the same result [Kaplan/Kaplan]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
16050 The goodness of a picture supervenes on the picture; duplicates must be equally good [Hare]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
15713 The first million numbers confirm that no number is greater than a million [Kaplan/Kaplan]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
2705 How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare]
2712 You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
2706 Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
2709 Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare]
2704 If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare]
2855 In primary evaluative words like 'ought' prescription is constant but description can vary [Hare, by Hooker,B]
22331 Moral statements are imperatives rather than the avowals of emotion - but universalisable [Hare, by Glock]
22484 Universalised prescriptivism could be seen as implying utilitarianism [Hare, by Foot]
4125 Hare says I acquire an agglomeration of preferences by role-reversal, leading to utilitarianism [Hare, by Williams,B]
4126 If we have to want the preferences of the many, we have to abandon our own deeply-held views [Williams,B on Hare]
4127 If morality is to be built on identification with the preferences of others, I must agree with their errors [Williams,B on Hare]
22483 A judgement is presciptive if we expect it to be acted on [Hare]
2703 Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare]
2707 If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare]
2708 An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare]
2711 Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 8. Contract Strategies
4360 By far the easiest way of seeming upright is to be upright [Hare]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
15640 Courage is not a virtue, but the form of every virtue at its testing point [Lewis,CS]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
2710 Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
6449 The categorical imperative leads to utilitarianism [Hare, by Nagel]