Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Cardinal/Hayward/Jones, Achille Varzi and Zoltn Gendler Szab

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21 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets
8956 What is a singleton set, if a set is meant to be a collection of objects? [Szabó]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
10653 Maybe set theory need not be well-founded [Varzi]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
10648 Mereology need not be nominalist, though it is often taken to be so [Varzi]
10655 Are there mereological atoms, and are all objects made of them? [Varzi]
10659 There is something of which everything is part, but no null-thing which is part of everything [Varzi]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
8953 Abstract entities don't depend on their concrete entities ...but maybe on the totality of concrete things [Szabó]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
10661 'Composition is identity' says multitudes are the reality, loosely composing single things [Varzi]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
10654 The parthood relation will help to define at least seven basic predicates [Varzi]
10651 If 'part' is reflexive, then identity is a limit case of parthood [Varzi]
10649 'Part' stands for a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation [Varzi]
10647 Parts may or may not be attached, demarcated, arbitrary, material, extended, spatial or temporal [Varzi]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
10658 Sameness of parts won't guarantee identity if their arrangement matters [Varzi]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
10652 Conceivability may indicate possibility, but literary fantasy does not [Varzi]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
7301 The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
7302 Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
7303 If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
7299 Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
7300 An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
7297 My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
8954 Geometrical circles cannot identify a circular paint patch, presumably because they lack something [Szabó]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 5. Abstracta by Negation
8955 Abstractions are imperceptible, non-causal, and non-spatiotemporal (the third explaining the others) [Szabó]