Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Cardinal/Hayward/Jones, H. Paul Grice and Sphaerus

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
The greatest philosophers are methodical; it is what makes them great [Grice]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
Conditionals are truth-functional, but we must take care with misleading ones [Grice, by Edgington]
The odd truth table for material conditionals is explained by conversational conventions [Grice, by Fisher]
Conditionals might remain truth-functional, despite inappropriate conversational remarks [Edgington on Grice]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals
Conditionals are truth-functional, but unassertable in tricky cases? [Grice, by Read]
A person can be justified in believing a proposition, though it is unreasonable to actually say it [Grice, by Edgington]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
Sphaerus he was not assenting to the presence of pomegranates, but that it was 'reasonable' [Sphaerus, by Diog. Laertius]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
Meaning needs an intention to induce a belief, and a recognition that this is the speaker's intention [Grice]
Only the utterer's primary intention is relevant to the meaning [Grice]
We judge linguistic intentions rather as we judge non-linguistic intentions, so they are alike [Grice]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
Grice said patterns of use are often semantically irrelevant, because it is a pragmatic matter [Grice, by Glock]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
Grice's maxim of quality says do not assert what you believe to be false [Grice, by Magidor]
Grice's maxim of manner requires one to be as brief as possible [Grice, by Magidor]
Key conversational maxims are 'quality' (assert truth) and 'quantity' (leave nothing out) [Grice, by Read]
Grice's maxim of quantity says be sufficiently informative [Grice, by Magidor]