13 ideas
| 12312 | The real essence of a thing is its powers, or 'dispositional properties' [Copi] |
| 10937 | Essential properties are the 'deepest' ones which explain the others [Copi, by Rami] |
| 12308 | In modern science, nominal essence is intended to be real essence [Copi] |
| 12303 | Within the four types of change, essential attributes are those whose loss means destruction [Copi] |
| 7301 | The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7302 | Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7303 | If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7299 | Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7300 | An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7297 | My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 20239 | Unlike us, the early Greeks thought envy was a good thing, and hope a bad thing [Hesiod, by Nietzsche] |
| 12307 | Modern science seeks essences, and is getting closer to them [Copi] |
| 12310 | Real essences are scientifically knowable, but so are non-essential properties [Copi] |