13 ideas
18270 | Choice suggests that intensions are not needed to ensure classes [Coffa] |
7301 | The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7302 | Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7303 | If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
18263 | The semantic tradition aimed to explain the a priori semantically, not by Kantian intuition [Coffa] |
18272 | Platonism defines the a priori in a way that makes it unknowable [Coffa] |
7299 | Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7300 | An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7297 | My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
22137 | Observation can force rejection of some part of the initial set of claims [Duhem, by Boulter] |
18197 | Experiments only test groups of hypotheses, and can't show which one is wrong [Duhem] |
18266 | Mathematics generalises by using variables [Coffa] |
18279 | Relativity is as absolutist about space-time as Newton was about space [Coffa] |