127 ideas
| 8558 | One system has properties, powers, events, similarity and substance [Shoemaker] |
| 8559 | Analysis aims at internal relationships, not reduction [Shoemaker] |
| 8594 | People have had good reasons for thinking that the circle has been squared [Shoemaker] |
| 15091 | Restrict 'logical truth' to formal logic, rather than including analytic and metaphysical truths [Shoemaker] |
| 8596 | Inability to measure equality doesn't make all lengths unequal [Shoemaker] |
| 8597 | We couldn't verify the earth's rotation if everyone simultaneously fell asleep [Shoemaker] |
| 15092 | Formerly I said properties are individuated by essential causal powers and causing instantiation [Shoemaker, by Shoemaker] |
| 15095 | A property's causal features are essential, and only they fix its identity [Shoemaker] |
| 15097 | I claim that a property has its causal features in all possible worlds [Shoemaker] |
| 8543 | Genuine properties are closely related to genuine changes [Shoemaker] |
| 8551 | Properties must be essentially causal if we can know and speak about them [Shoemaker] |
| 8557 | To ascertain genuine properties, examine the object directly [Shoemaker] |
| 15761 | We should abandon the idea that properties are the meanings of predicate expressions [Shoemaker] |
| 15756 | Some truths are not because of a thing's properties, but because of the properties of related things [Shoemaker] |
| 15758 | Things have powers in virtue of (which are entailed by) their properties [Shoemaker] |
| 8547 | One power can come from different properties; a thing's powers come from its properties [Shoemaker] |
| 8549 | Properties are functions producing powers, and powers are functions producing effects [Shoemaker] |
| 15094 | I now deny that properties are cluster of powers, and take causal properties as basic [Shoemaker] |
| 12678 | Shoemaker says all genuine properties are dispositional [Shoemaker, by Ellis] |
| 8545 | A causal theory of properties focuses on change, not (say) on abstract properties of numbers [Shoemaker] |
| 15757 | 'Square', 'round' and 'made of copper' show that not all properties are dispositional [Shoemaker] |
| 15759 | The identity of a property concerns its causal powers [Shoemaker] |
| 15760 | Properties are clusters of conditional powers [Shoemaker] |
| 15762 | Could properties change without the powers changing, or powers change without the properties changing? [Shoemaker] |
| 8552 | If properties are separated from causal powers, this invites total elimination [Shoemaker] |
| 4040 | The notions of property and of causal power are parts of a single system of related concepts [Shoemaker] |
| 15765 | Actually, properties are individuated by causes as well as effects [Shoemaker] |
| 14534 | Shoemaker moved from properties as powers to properties bestowing powers [Shoemaker, by Mumford/Anjum] |
| 8548 | Dispositional predicates ascribe powers, and the rest ascribe properties [Shoemaker] |
| 9485 | Universals concern how things are, and how they could be [Shoemaker, by Bird] |
| 8550 | Triangular and trilateral are coextensive, but different concepts; but powers and properties are the same [Shoemaker] |
| 8555 | There is no subset of properties which guarantee a thing's identity [Shoemaker] |
| 15099 | If something is possible, but not nomologically possible, we need metaphysical possibility [Shoemaker] |
| 8554 | Possible difference across worlds depends on difference across time in the actual world [Shoemaker] |
| 20146 | 'Luck' is the unpredictable and inexplicable intersection of causal chains [Kekes] |
| 15101 | Once you give up necessity as a priori, causal necessity becomes the main type of necessity [Shoemaker] |
| 15764 | 'Conceivable' is either not-provably-false, or compatible with what we know? [Shoemaker] |
| 15098 | Empirical evidence shows that imagining a phenomenon can show it is possible [Shoemaker] |
| 15100 | Imagination reveals conceptual possibility, where descriptions avoid contradiction or incoherence [Shoemaker] |
| 8562 | It is possible to conceive what is not possible [Shoemaker] |
| 7301 | The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7302 | Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7303 | If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7299 | Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7300 | An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 5691 | The adverbial account of sensation says not 'see a red image' but be 'appeared to redly' [Shoemaker] |
| 23101 | Intuitions don't prove things; they just receptivity to interpretations [Kekes] |
| 7297 | My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 8593 | Maybe billions of changeless years have elapsed since my last meal [Shoemaker] |
| 8556 | Grueness is not, unlike green and blue, associated with causal potential [Shoemaker] |
| 15096 | 'Grue' only has causal features because of its relation to green [Shoemaker] |
| 5687 | For true introspection, must we be aware that we are aware of our mental events? [Shoemaker] |
| 5688 | Empirical foundationalism says basic knowledge is self-intimating, and incorrigible or infallible [Shoemaker] |
| 1389 | If memory is the sole criterion of identity, we ought to use it for other people too [Shoemaker] |
| 1390 | Bodily identity is one criterion and memory another, for personal identity [Shoemaker, by PG] |
| 20169 | An action may be intended under one description, but not under another [Kekes] |
| 20149 | To control our actions better, make them result from our attitudes, not from circumstances [Kekes] |
| 23086 | Liberals say we are only responsible for fully autonomous actions [Kekes] |
| 23100 | Collective responsibility conflicts with responsibility's requirement of authonomy [Kekes] |
| 19738 | Values are an attempt to achieve well-being by bringing contingencies under control [Kekes] |
| 20145 | Values help us to control life, by connecting it to what is stable and manageable [Kekes] |
| 23087 | Much human evil is not autonomous, so moral responsibility need not be autonomous [Kekes] |
| 23089 | Evil people may not be autonomously aware, if they misjudge the situation [Kekes] |
| 23093 | Moral and causal responsibility are not clearly distinct [Kekes] |
| 23098 | Effects show the existence of moral responsibility, and mental states show the degree [Kekes] |
| 20170 | Responsibility is unprovoked foreseeable harm, against society, arising from vicious character [Kekes] |
| 23096 | Morality should aim to prevent all evil actions, not just autonomous ones [Kekes] |
| 23095 | Why should moral responsibility depend on autonomy, rather than social role or experience? [Kekes] |
| 23094 | Ought implies can means moral responsibility needs autonomy [Kekes] |
| 20165 | Reason and morality do not coincide; immorality can be reasonable, with an ideology [Kekes] |
| 20171 | Practical reason is not universal and impersonal, because it depends on what success is [Kekes] |
| 20175 | If morality has to be rational, then moral conflicts need us to be irrational and immoral [Kekes] |
| 23090 | Liberals assume people are naturally free, equal, rational, and morally good [Kekes] |
| 20174 | Relativists say all values are relative; pluralists concede much of that, but not 'human' values [Kekes] |
| 20156 | We are bound to regret some values we never aspired to [Kekes] |
| 20150 | There are far more values than we can pursue, so they are optional possibilities [Kekes] |
| 20158 | Innumerable values arise for us, from our humanity, our culture, and our individuality [Kekes] |
| 20159 | Cultural values are interpretations of humanity, conduct, institutions, and evaluations [Kekes] |
| 20161 | The big value problems are evil (humanity), disenchantment (cultures), and boredom (individuals) [Kekes] |
| 20151 | Our attitudes include what possibilities we value, and also what is allowable, and unthinkable [Kekes] |
| 20152 | Unconditional commitments are our most basic convictions, saying what must never be done [Kekes] |
| 20153 | Doing the unthinkable damages ourselves, so it is more basic than any value [Kekes] |
| 23117 | Love should be partial, and discriminate in favour of its object [Kekes] |
| 23119 | Sentimental love distorts its object [Kekes] |
| 20162 | Evil isn't explained by nature, by monsters, by uncharacteristic actions, or by society [Kekes] |
| 23088 | Evil is not deviation from the good, any more than good is a deviation from evil [Kekes] |
| 23097 | What matters for morality is the effects of action, not the psychological causes [Kekes] |
| 20154 | Control is the key to well-being [Kekes] |
| 20157 | Well-being needs correct attitudes and well-ordered commitments to local values [Kekes] |
| 23099 | It is said that if an agent is not autonomous then their evil actions don't reflect on their character [Kekes] |
| 23118 | Awareness of others' suffering doesn't create an obligation to help [Kekes] |
| 20173 | Boredom is apathy and restlessness, yearning for something interesting [Kekes] |
| 20172 | Boredom destroys our ability to evaluate [Kekes] |
| 20155 | Society is alienating if it lacks our values, and its values repel us [Kekes] |
| 23109 | The veil of ignorance is only needed because people have bad motivations [Kekes] |
| 23114 | The chief function of the state is to arbitrate between contending visions of the good life [Kekes] |
| 20164 | The ideal of an ideology is embodied in a text, a role model, a law of history, a dream of the past... [Kekes] |
| 20163 | Ideologies have beliefs about reality, ideals, a gap with actuality, and a program [Kekes] |
| 23116 | Citizenship is easier than parenthood [Kekes] |
| 23103 | Power is meant to be confined to representatives, and subsequent delegation [Kekes] |
| 23107 | Prosperity is a higher social virtue than justice [Kekes] |
| 23081 | Liberal basics are pluralism, freedom, rights, equality, and distributive justice - for autonomy [Kekes] |
| 23085 | The key liberal values are explained by the one core value, which is autonomy [Kekes] |
| 23092 | Agents have little control over the capacities needed for liberal autonomy [Kekes] |
| 23102 | Liberals are egalitarians, but in varying degrees [Kekes] |
| 23084 | Are egalitarians too coercive, or not egalitarian enough, or lax over morality? [Kekes] |
| 23079 | Liberal justice ignores desert, which is the essence of justice [Kekes] |
| 23091 | Why do liberals not see a much wider range of values as basic? [Kekes] |
| 23112 | Liberals ignore contingency, and think people are good and equal, and institutions cause evil [Kekes] |
| 23082 | Liberal distribution cares more about recipients than donors [Kekes] |
| 23106 | To rectify the undeserved equality, we should give men longer and women shorter lives [Kekes] |
| 23121 | It is just a fact that some people are morally better than others [Kekes] |
| 23105 | It is not deplorable that billionaires have more than millionaires [Kekes] |
| 23120 | The problem is basic insufficiency of resources, not their inequality [Kekes] |
| 20148 | Equal distribution is no good in a shortage, because there might be no one satisfied [Kekes] |
| 23108 | Justice combines consistency and desert; treat likes alike, judging likeness by desert [Kekes] |
| 23083 | Liberal welfare focuses on need rather than desert [Kekes] |
| 23113 | Sexual morality doesn't require monogamy, but it needs a group of sensible regulations [Kekes] |
| 8542 | If causality is between events, there must be reference to the properties involved [Shoemaker] |
| 8598 | If things turn red for an hour and then explode, we wouldn't say the redness was the cause [Shoemaker] |
| 15093 | We might say laws are necessary by combining causal properties with Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley laws [Shoemaker] |
| 8560 | If causal laws describe causal potentialities, the same laws govern properties in all possible worlds [Shoemaker] |
| 15763 | If properties are causal, then causal necessity is a species of logical necessity [Shoemaker] |
| 8561 | If a world has different causal laws, it must have different properties [Shoemaker] |
| 8553 | It looks as if the immutability of the powers of a property imply essentiality [Shoemaker] |
| 4226 | If three regions 'freeze' every three, four and five years, after sixty years everything stops for a year [Shoemaker, by Lowe] |
| 8595 | If three regions freeze every 3rd, 4th and 5th year, they all freeze together every 60 years [Shoemaker] |