17 ideas
15797 | All structures are dispositional, objects are dispositions sets, and events manifest dispositions [Fetzer] |
15800 | All events and objects are dispositional, and hence all structural properties are dispositional [Fetzer] |
3144 | Everything is what it is, and not another thing [Butler] |
21315 | A tree remains the same in the popular sense, but not in the strict philosophical sense [Butler] |
7301 | The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7302 | Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7303 | If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7299 | Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7300 | An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7297 | My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
21317 | Despite consciousness fluctuating, we are aware that it belongs to one person [Butler] |
21313 | If consciousness of events makes our identity, then if we have forgotten them we didn't exist then [Butler] |
21314 | Consciousness presupposes personal identity, so it cannot constitute it [Butler] |
21318 | If the self changes, we have no responsibilities, and no interest in past or future [Butler] |
8066 | Butler exalts conscience, but it may be horribly misleading [Anscombe on Butler] |
15798 | Kinds are arrangements of dispositions [Fetzer] |
15799 | Lawlike sentences are general attributions of disposition to all members of some class [Fetzer] |