20 ideas
23449 | Interpreting a text is representing it as making sense [Morris,M] |
23484 | Bipolarity adds to Bivalence the capacity for both truth values [Morris,M] |
23494 | Conjunctive and disjunctive quantifiers are too specific, and are confined to the finite [Morris,M] |
23460 | To count, we must distinguish things, and have a series with successors in it [Morris,M] |
23451 | Counting needs to distinguish things, and also needs the concept of a successor in a series [Morris,M] |
23452 | Discriminating things for counting implies concepts of identity and distinctness [Morris,M] |
3144 | Everything is what it is, and not another thing [Butler] |
21315 | A tree remains the same in the popular sense, but not in the strict philosophical sense [Butler] |
7301 | The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7302 | Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7303 | If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7299 | Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7300 | An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7297 | My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
21317 | Despite consciousness fluctuating, we are aware that it belongs to one person [Butler] |
21313 | If consciousness of events makes our identity, then if we have forgotten them we didn't exist then [Butler] |
21314 | Consciousness presupposes personal identity, so it cannot constitute it [Butler] |
21318 | If the self changes, we have no responsibilities, and no interest in past or future [Butler] |
23491 | There must exist a general form of propositions, which are predictabe. It is: such and such is the case [Morris,M] |
8066 | Butler exalts conscience, but it may be horribly misleading [Anscombe on Butler] |