25 ideas
2945 | Most philosophers start with reality and then examine knowledge; Descartes put the study of knowledge first [Lehrer] |
2946 | You cannot demand an analysis of a concept without knowing the purpose of the analysis [Lehrer] |
9376 | A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian] |
6345 | Minimalism is incoherent, as it implies that truth both is and is not a property [Boghossian, by Horwich] |
9375 | Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian] |
7301 | The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7302 | Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7303 | If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
9369 | 'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation [Boghossian] |
9367 | The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian] |
9373 | That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian] |
9380 | We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian] |
9384 | We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory [Boghossian] |
7299 | Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7300 | An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
9374 | If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? [Boghossian] |
9329 | Justification is coherence with a background system; if irrefutable, it is knowledge [Lehrer] |
7297 | My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
9330 | Generalization seems to be more fundamental to minds than spotting similarities [Lehrer] |
9328 | All conscious states can be immediately known when attention is directed to them [Lehrer] |
9377 | 'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences [Boghossian] |
9378 | If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job? [Boghossian] |
9372 | Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same? [Boghossian] |
17721 | There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Boghossian, by Jenkins] |
9368 | Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian] |