19 ideas
17809 | Gödel showed that the syntactic approach to the infinite is of limited value [Kreisel] |
17810 | The study of mathematical foundations needs new non-mathematical concepts [Kreisel] |
3523 | Shadows are supervenient on their objects, but not reducible [Maslin] |
3517 | 'Ontology' means 'study of things which exist' [Maslin] |
7301 | The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7302 | Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7303 | If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7299 | Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7300 | An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7297 | My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
3538 | Analogy to other minds is uncheckable, over-confident and chauvinistic [Maslin] |
3540 | If we are brains then we never meet each other [Maslin] |
3518 | I'm not the final authority on my understanding of maths [Maslin] |
3530 | Denial of purely mental causation will lead to epiphenomenalism [Maslin] |
3520 | Token-identity removes the explanatory role of the physical [Maslin] |
3528 | Causality may require that a law is being followed [Maslin] |
3525 | Strict laws make causation logically necessary [Maslin] |
3527 | Strict laws allow no exceptions and are part of a closed system [Maslin] |
17811 | The natural conception of points ducks the problem of naming or constructing each point [Kreisel] |