17 ideas
| 10757 | Henkin semantics has a second domain of predicates and relations (in upper case) [Rossberg] |
| 10751 | Second-order logic needs the sets, and its consequence has epistemological problems [Rossberg] |
| 10759 | There are at least seven possible systems of semantics for second-order logic [Rossberg] |
| 10753 | Logical consequence is intuitively semantic, and captured by model theory [Rossberg] |
| 10752 | Γ |- S says S can be deduced from Γ; Γ |= S says a good model for Γ makes S true [Rossberg] |
| 10754 | In proof-theory, logical form is shown by the logical constants [Rossberg] |
| 10756 | A model is a domain, and an interpretation assigning objects, predicates, relations etc. [Rossberg] |
| 10758 | If models of a mathematical theory are all isomorphic, it is 'categorical', with essentially one model [Rossberg] |
| 10761 | Completeness can always be achieved by cunning model-design [Rossberg] |
| 10755 | A deductive system is only incomplete with respect to a formal semantics [Rossberg] |
| 12468 | A state of affairs is only possible if there has been an actual substance to initiate it [Pruss] |
| 7301 | The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7302 | Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7303 | If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7299 | Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7300 | An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7297 | My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |