11 ideas
7301 | The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7302 | Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7303 | If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7299 | Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7300 | An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7297 | My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
3916 | Hopi consistently prefers verbs and events to nouns and things [Whorf] |
3914 | Language arranges sensory experience to form a world-order [Whorf] |
3917 | Scientific thought is essentially a specialised part of Indo-European languages [Whorf] |
7296 | 'Grue' is not a colour [Milsted] |
3915 | The Hopi have no concept of time as something flowing from past to future [Whorf] |