16 ideas
8368 | A correct definition is what can be substituted without loss of meaning [Ducasse] |
8836 | Must all justification be inferential? [Ginet] |
8837 | Inference cannot originate justification, it can only transfer it from premises to conclusion [Ginet] |
20877 | Errors in moral practice might be inconsistent or inappropriate principles, or inappropriate application [LaFollette] |
20878 | We can discuss the criteria of a judgment, or the weight given to them, or their application [LaFollette] |
20881 | The act/omission distinction is important for duties, but less so for consequences [LaFollette] |
20886 | Are we only obligated by agreement, or should we always help the weak? [LaFollette] |
20879 | Too many options may open us to unwanted pressures, like being paid very little [LaFollette] |
20880 | Should people be forced to make choices? [LaFollette] |
8367 | Causation is defined in terms of a single sequence, and constant conjunction is no part of it [Ducasse] |
8372 | We see what is in common between causes to assign names to them, not to perceive them [Ducasse] |
8369 | Causes are either sufficient, or necessary, or necessitated, or contingent upon [Ducasse] |
8373 | When a brick and a canary-song hit a window, we ignore the canary if we are interested in the breakage [Ducasse] |
8370 | A cause is a change which occurs close to the effect and just before it [Ducasse] |
8371 | Recurrence is only relevant to the meaning of law, not to the meaning of cause [Ducasse] |
8374 | We are interested in generalising about causes and effects purely for practical purposes [Ducasse] |