Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Carl Ginet, E Reck / M Price and Sebastian Gardner

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30 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / c. Eighteenth century philosophy
Hamann, Herder and Jacobi were key opponents of the Enlightenment [Gardner]
Kant halted rationalism, and forced empiricists to worry about foundations [Gardner]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Only Kant and Hegel have united nature, morals, politics, aesthetics and religion [Gardner]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 2. Transcendental Argument
Transcendental proofs derive necessities from possibilities (e.g. possibility of experiencing objects) [Gardner]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
While true-in-a-model seems relative, true-in-all-models seems not to be [Reck/Price]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
ZFC set theory has only 'pure' sets, without 'urelements' [Reck/Price]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
Three types of variable in second-order logic, for objects, functions, and predicates/sets [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Modern geoemtry is either 'pure' (and formal), or 'applied' (and a posteriori) [Gardner]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
'Analysis' is the theory of the real numbers [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
Mereological arithmetic needs infinite objects, and function definitions [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / e. Peano arithmetic 2nd-order
Peano Arithmetic can have three second-order axioms, plus '1' and 'successor' [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Set-theory gives a unified and an explicit basis for mathematics [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
Structuralism emerged from abstract algebra, axioms, and set theory and its structures [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / b. Varieties of structuralism
Relativist Structuralism just stipulates one successful model as its arithmetic [Reck/Price]
There are 'particular' structures, and 'universal' structures (what the former have in common) [Reck/Price]
Pattern Structuralism studies what isomorphic arithmetic models have in common [Reck/Price]
There are Formalist, Relativist, Universalist and Pattern structuralism [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism
Formalist Structuralism says the ontology is vacuous, or formal, or inference relations [Reck/Price]
Maybe we should talk of an infinity of 'possible' objects, to avoid arithmetic being vacuous [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / d. Platonist structuralism
Universalist Structuralism is based on generalised if-then claims, not one particular model [Reck/Price]
Universalist Structuralism eliminates the base element, as a variable, which is then quantified out [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
The existence of an infinite set is assumed by Relativist Structuralism [Reck/Price]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
Leibnizian monads qualify as Kantian noumena [Gardner]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 6. Mereological Nominalism
A nominalist might avoid abstract objects by just appealing to mereological sums [Reck/Price]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
Must all justification be inferential? [Ginet]
Inference cannot originate justification, it can only transfer it from premises to conclusion [Ginet]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
Aesthetics presupposes a distinctive sort of experience, and a unified essence for art [Gardner]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 7. Ontology of Art
Art works originate in the artist's mind, and appreciation is re-creating this mental object [Gardner]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
Aesthetic objectivists must explain pleasure being essential, but not in the object [Gardner]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
Aesthetic judgements necessarily require first-hand experience, unlike moral judgements [Gardner]