95 ideas
19441 | All philosophies presuppose their historical moment, and arise from it [Feuerbach] |
19456 | Philosophy is distinguished from other sciences by its complete lack of presuppositions [Feuerbach] |
19442 | I don't study Plato for his own sake; the primary aim is always understanding [Feuerbach] |
6928 | Only that which can be an object of religion is an object of philosophy [Feuerbach] |
6979 | Serious metaphysics cares about entailment between sentences [Jackson] |
6980 | Conceptual analysis studies whether one story is made true by another story [Jackson] |
6983 | Intuitions about possibilities are basic to conceptual analysis [Jackson] |
14707 | Conceptual analysis is needed to establish that metaphysical reductions respect original meanings [Jackson, by Schroeter] |
6918 | Philosophy should not focus on names, but on the determined nature of things [Feuerbach] |
6904 | Modern philosophy begins with Descartes' abstraction from sensation and matter [Feuerbach] |
6931 | Empiricism is right about ideas, but forgets man himself as one of our objects [Feuerbach] |
6933 | The laws of reality are also the laws of thought [Feuerbach] |
19444 | Each proposition has an antithesis, and truth exists as its refutation [Feuerbach] |
19445 | A dialectician has to be his own opponent [Feuerbach] |
19443 | Truth forges an impersonal unity between people [Feuerbach] |
7005 | Something can only have a place in a preferred account of things if it is entailed by the account [Jackson] |
6994 | Truth supervenes on being [Jackson] |
14352 | '¬', '&', and 'v' are truth functions: the truth of the compound is fixed by the truth of the components [Jackson] |
6919 | Absolute thought remains in another world from being [Feuerbach] |
19457 | Being is what is undetermined, and hence indistinguishable [Feuerbach] |
6920 | Being posits essence, and my essence is my being [Feuerbach] |
6921 | Particularity belongs to being, whereas generality belongs to thought [Feuerbach] |
6926 | The only true being is of the senses, perception, feeling and love [Feuerbach] |
6984 | Smooth reductions preserve high-level laws in the lower level [Jackson] |
6978 | Baldness is just hair distribution, but the former is indeterminate, unlike the latter [Jackson] |
19446 | To our consciousness it is language which looks unreal [Feuerbach] |
6993 | Redness is a property, but only as a presentation to normal humans [Jackson] |
8499 | Nominalists cannot translate 'red resembles pink more than blue' into particulars [Jackson] |
8500 | Colour resemblance isn't just resemblance between things; 'colour' must be mentioned [Jackson] |
14633 | How do we tell a table's being contingently plastic from its being essentially plastic? [Jackson] |
14635 | An x is essentially F if it is F in every possible world in which it appears [Jackson] |
14632 | Quine may have conflated de re and de dicto essentialism, but there is a real epistemological problem [Jackson] |
6987 | We should not multiply senses of necessity beyond necessity [Jackson] |
14360 | Possible worlds for subjunctives (and dispositions), and no-truth for indicatives? [Jackson] |
14288 | 'If A,B' affirms that A⊃B, and also that this wouldn't change if A were certain [Jackson, by Edgington] |
13769 | Conditionals are truth-functional, but should only be asserted when they are confident [Jackson, by Edgington] |
13858 | The truth-functional account of conditionals is right, if the antecedent is really acceptable [Jackson, by Edgington] |
14289 | There are some assertable conditionals one would reject if one learned the antecedent [Jackson, by Edgington] |
14353 | Modus ponens requires that A→B is F when A is T and B is F [Jackson] |
14354 | When A and B have the same truth value, A→B is true, because A→A is a logical truth [Jackson] |
14355 | (A&B)→A is a logical truth, even if antecedent false and consequent true, so it is T if A is F and B is T [Jackson] |
14358 | In the possible worlds account of conditionals, modus ponens and modus tollens are validated [Jackson] |
14359 | Only assertions have truth-values, and conditionals are not proper assertions [Jackson] |
14357 | Possible worlds account, unlike A⊃B, says nothing about when A is false [Jackson] |
14356 | We can't insist that A is relevant to B, as conditionals can express lack of relevance [Jackson] |
14631 | How can you show the necessity of an a posteriori necessity, if it might turn out to be false? [Jackson] |
6988 | Mathematical sentences are a problem in a possible-worlds framework [Jackson] |
6975 | Possible worlds could be concrete, abstract, universals, sentences, or properties [Jackson] |
6908 | Consciousness is absolute reality, and everything exists through consciousness [Feuerbach] |
19447 | The Absolute is the 'and' which unites 'spirit and nature' [Feuerbach] |
6932 | Ideas arise through communication, and reason is reached through community [Feuerbach] |
6982 | Long arithmetic calculations show the a priori can be fallible [Jackson] |
6991 | We examine objects to determine colour; we do not introspect [Jackson] |
6935 | In man the lowest senses of smell and taste elevate themselves to intellectual acts [Feuerbach] |
8836 | Must all justification be inferential? [Ginet] |
8837 | Inference cannot originate justification, it can only transfer it from premises to conclusion [Ginet] |
4894 | I say Mary does not have new knowledge, but knows an old fact in a new way [Perry on Jackson] |
4895 | Is it unfair that physicalist knowledge can be written down, but dualist knowledge can't be [Perry on Jackson] |
4886 | Mary knows all the physical facts of seeing red, but experiencing it is new knowledge [Jackson] |
6976 | In physicalism, the psychological depends on the physical, not the other way around [Jackson] |
6986 | Is the dependence of the psychological on the physical a priori or a posteriori? [Jackson] |
6992 | If different states can fulfil the same role, the converse must also be possible [Jackson] |
7880 | If a blind persons suddenly sees a kestrel, that doesn't make visual and theoretical kestrels different [Papineau on Jackson] |
7378 | No one bothers to imagine what it would really be like to have ALL the physical information [Dennett on Jackson] |
7377 | Mary learns when she sees colour, so her complete physical information had missed something [Jackson] |
6996 | Folk psychology covers input, internal role, and output [Jackson] |
19451 | When absorbed in deep reflection, is your reason in control, or is it you? [Feuerbach] |
6977 | Egocentric or de se content seems to be irreducibly so [Jackson] |
6990 | Keep distinct the essential properties of water, and application conditions for the word 'water' [Jackson] |
6985 | Analysis is finding necessary and sufficient conditions by studying possible cases [Jackson] |
6925 | The new philosophy thinks of the concrete in a concrete (not a abstract) manner [Feuerbach] |
6995 | Successful predication supervenes on nature [Jackson] |
6989 | I can understand "He has a beard", without identifying 'he', and hence the truth conditions [Jackson] |
6998 | Folk morality does not clearly distinguish between doing and allowing [Jackson] |
6997 | Moral functionalism says moral terms get their meaning from their role in folk morality [Jackson] |
7000 | Which are prior - thin concepts like right, good, ought; or thick concepts like kindness, equity etc.? [Jackson] |
6924 | Plotinus was ashamed to have a body [Feuerbach] |
6927 | If you love nothing, it doesn't matter whether something exists or not [Feuerbach] |
19450 | Reason, love and will are the highest perfections and essence of man - the purpose of his life [Feuerbach] |
19458 | Egoism is the only evil, love the only good; genuine love produces all the other virtues [Feuerbach] |
6934 | Man is not a particular being, like animals, but a universal being [Feuerbach] |
6936 | The essence of man is in community, but with distinct individuals [Feuerbach] |
6999 | It is hard to justify the huge difference in our judgements of abortion and infanticide [Jackson] |
19448 | Consciousness is said to distinguish man from animals - consciousness of his own species [Feuerbach] |
19454 | A God needs justice, kindness and wisdom, but those concepts don't depend on the concept of God [Feuerbach] |
6913 | God's existence cannot be separated from essence and concept, which can only be thought as existing [Feuerbach] |
19452 | The nature of God is an expression of human nature [Feuerbach] |
6903 | If God is only an object for man, then only the essence of man is revealed in God [Feuerbach] |
6923 | God is what man would like to be [Feuerbach] |
6911 | God is for us a mere empty idea, which we fill with our own ego and essence [Feuerbach] |
19453 | If love, goodness and personality are human, the God who is their source is anthropomorphic [Feuerbach] |
6902 | Catholicism concerns God in himself, Protestantism what God is for man [Feuerbach] |
19449 | Religion is the consciousness of the infinite [Feuerbach] |
6905 | Absolute idealism is the realized divine mind of Leibnizian theism [Feuerbach] |
19455 | Today's atheism will tomorrow become a religion [Feuerbach] |