52 ideas
3750 | "It is true that x" means no more than x [Ramsey] |
13430 | Infinity: there is an infinity of distinguishable individuals [Ramsey] |
13428 | Reducibility: to every non-elementary function there is an equivalent elementary function [Ramsey] |
13427 | Either 'a = b' vacuously names the same thing, or absurdly names different things [Ramsey] |
13334 | Contradictions are either purely logical or mathematical, or they involved thought and language [Ramsey] |
12154 | Are 'word token' and 'word type' different sorts of countable objects, or two ways of counting? [Geach, by Perry] |
10735 | Abstraction from objects won't reveal an operation's being performed 'so many times' [Geach] |
6409 | The 'simple theory of types' distinguishes levels among properties [Ramsey, by Grayling] |
13426 | Formalists neglect content, but the logicists have focused on generalizations, and neglected form [Ramsey] |
13425 | Formalism is hopeless, because it focuses on propositions and ignores concepts [Ramsey] |
8780 | Attributes are functions, not objects; this distinguishes 'square of 2' from 'double of 2' [Geach] |
8495 | The distinction between particulars and universals is a mistake made because of language [Ramsey] |
8493 | We could make universals collections of particulars, or particulars collections of their qualities [Ramsey] |
8494 | Obviously 'Socrates is wise' and 'Socrates has wisdom' express the same fact [Ramsey] |
8969 | We should abandon absolute identity, confining it to within some category [Geach, by Hawthorne] |
16075 | Denial of absolute identity has drastic implications for logic, semantics and set theory [Wasserman on Geach] |
12152 | Identity is relative. One must not say things are 'the same', but 'the same A as' [Geach] |
16073 | Leibniz's Law is incomplete, since it includes a non-relativized identity predicate [Geach, by Wasserman] |
11910 | Being 'the same' is meaningless, unless we specify 'the same X' [Geach] |
13766 | 'If' is the same as 'given that', so the degrees of belief should conform to probability theory [Ramsey, by Ramsey] |
10993 | Ramsey's Test: believe the consequent if you believe the antecedent [Ramsey, by Read] |
14279 | Asking 'If p, will q?' when p is uncertain, then first add p hypothetically to your knowledge [Ramsey] |
3212 | Beliefs are maps by which we steer [Ramsey] |
22328 | I just confront the evidence, and let it act on me [Ramsey] |
8836 | Must all justification be inferential? [Ginet] |
8837 | Inference cannot originate justification, it can only transfer it from premises to conclusion [Ginet] |
22325 | A belief is knowledge if it is true, certain and obtained by a reliable process [Ramsey] |
19724 | Belief is knowledge if it is true, certain, and obtained by a reliable process [Ramsey] |
6894 | Mental terms can be replaced in a sentence by a variable and an existential quantifier [Ramsey] |
19143 | Ramsey gave axioms for an uncertain agent to decide their preferences [Ramsey, by Davidson] |
8775 | A big flea is a small animal, so 'big' and 'small' cannot be acquired by abstraction [Geach] |
8776 | We cannot learn relations by abstraction, because their converse must be learned too [Geach] |
10732 | If concepts are just recognitional, then general judgements would be impossible [Geach] |
2567 | You can't define real mental states in terms of behaviour that never happens [Geach] |
2568 | Beliefs aren't tied to particular behaviours [Geach] |
8781 | The mind does not lift concepts from experience; it creates them, and then applies them [Geach] |
10731 | For abstractionists, concepts are capacities to recognise recurrent features of the world [Geach] |
8769 | If someone has aphasia but can still play chess, they clearly have concepts [Geach] |
8770 | 'Abstractionism' is acquiring a concept by picking out one experience amongst a group [Geach] |
8771 | 'Or' and 'not' are not to be found in the sensible world, or even in the world of inner experience [Geach] |
8772 | We can't acquire number-concepts by extracting the number from the things being counted [Geach] |
8773 | Abstractionists can't explain counting, because it must precede experience of objects [Geach] |
8774 | The numbers don't exist in nature, so they cannot have been abstracted from there into our languages [Geach] |
8778 | Blind people can use colour words like 'red' perfectly intelligently [Geach] |
8777 | If 'black' and 'cat' can be used in the absence of such objects, how can such usage be abstracted? [Geach] |
8779 | We can form two different abstract concepts that apply to a single unified experience [Geach] |
10733 | The abstractionist cannot explain 'some' and 'not' [Geach] |
10734 | Only a judgement can distinguish 'striking' from 'being struck' [Geach] |
18818 | Sentence meaning is given by the actions to which it would lead [Ramsey] |
22489 | 'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot] |
9418 | All knowledge needs systematizing, and the axioms would be the laws of nature [Ramsey] |
9420 | Causal laws result from the simplest axioms of a complete deductive system [Ramsey] |