Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Carl Hempel, C. Anthony Anderson and Reiss,J/Spreger,J

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22 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
One view says objectivity is making a successful claim which captures the facts [Reiss/Sprenger]
An absolute scientific picture of reality must not involve sense experience, which is perspectival [Reiss/Sprenger]
Topic and application involve values, but can evidence and theory choice avoid them? [Reiss/Sprenger]
The Value-Free Ideal in science avoids contextual values, but embraces epistemic values [Reiss/Sprenger]
Value-free science needs impartial evaluation, theories asserting facts, and right motivation [Reiss/Sprenger]
Thermometers depend on the substance used, and none of them are perfect [Reiss/Sprenger]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
Free logics has terms that do not designate real things, and even empty domains [Anderson,CA]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
Basic variables in second-order logic are taken to range over subsets of the individuals [Anderson,CA]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
Stop calling ∃ the 'existential' quantifier, read it as 'there is...', and range over all entities [Anderson,CA]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
Do mathematicians use 'existence' differently when they say some entity exists? [Anderson,CA]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
We can distinguish 'ontological' from 'existential' commitment, for different kinds of being [Anderson,CA]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
's is non-existent' cannot be said if 's' does not designate [Anderson,CA]
We cannot pick out a thing and deny its existence, but we can say a concept doesn't correspond [Anderson,CA]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Individuation was a problem for medievals, then Leibniz, then Frege, then Wittgenstein (somewhat) [Anderson,CA]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
The notion of 'property' is unclear for a logical version of the Identity of Indiscernibles [Anderson,CA]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
The 'experimenter's regress' says success needs reliability, which is only tested by success [Reiss/Sprenger]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
Explanatory facts also predict, and predictive facts also explain [Hempel, by Okasha]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
The Bayesian approach is explicitly subjective about probabilities [Reiss/Sprenger]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
Scientific explanation aims at a unifying account of underlying structures and processes [Hempel]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
For Hempel, explanations are deductive-nomological or probabilistic-statistical [Hempel, by Bird]
The covering-law model is for scientific explanation; historical explanation is quite different [Hempel]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Hempel rejects causation as part of explanation [Hempel, by Salmon]