12 ideas
20728 | Metaphysics is hopeless with its present epistemology; common-sense realism is needed [Colvin] |
20726 | We can only distinguish self from non-self if there is an inflexible external reality [Colvin] |
20727 | Common-sense realism rests on our interests and practical life [Colvin] |
20729 | Arguments that objects are unknowable or non-existent assume the knower's existence [Colvin] |
20730 | If objects are doubted because their appearances change, that presupposes one object [Colvin] |
20731 | The idea that everything is relations is contradictory; relations are part of the concept of things [Colvin] |
22179 | Explanatory facts also predict, and predictive facts also explain [Hempel, by Okasha] |
21507 | Scientific explanation aims at a unifying account of underlying structures and processes [Hempel] |
6755 | For Hempel, explanations are deductive-nomological or probabilistic-statistical [Hempel, by Bird] |
17083 | The covering-law model is for scientific explanation; historical explanation is quite different [Hempel] |
13052 | Hempel rejects causation as part of explanation [Hempel, by Salmon] |
7272 | Maybe lots of qualia lead to intentionality, rather than intentionality being basic [Gildersleve] |