Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Carl Hempel, Henry E. Kyburg Jr and Penelope Mackie

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24 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / e. The Lottery paradox
6368 If my ticket won't win the lottery (and it won't), no other tickets will either [Kyburg, by Pollock/Cruz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
11897 A principle of individuation may pinpoint identity and distinctness, now and over time [Mackie,P]
11898 Individuation may include counterfactual possibilities, as well as identity and persistence [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
11883 A haecceity is the essential, simple, unanalysable property of being-this-thing [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
11889 Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
11877 An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without [Mackie,P]
11882 No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object [Mackie,P]
11886 There are problems both with individual essences and without them [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
11909 Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary [Mackie,P]
11899 Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential? [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
11906 The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
11894 Origin is not a necessity, it is just 'tenacious'; we keep it fixed in counterfactual discussions [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
11887 Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities' [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
11890 De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts [Mackie,P]
11892 Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation [Mackie,P]
11893 Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
11884 The theory of 'haecceitism' does not need commitment to individual haecceities [Mackie,P]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
22179 Explanatory facts also predict, and predictive facts also explain [Hempel, by Okasha]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
21507 Scientific explanation aims at a unifying account of underlying structures and processes [Hempel]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
6755 For Hempel, explanations are deductive-nomological or probabilistic-statistical [Hempel, by Bird]
17083 The covering-law model is for scientific explanation; historical explanation is quite different [Hempel]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
13052 Hempel rejects causation as part of explanation [Hempel, by Salmon]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
11905 Locke's kind essences are explanatory, without being necessary to the kind [Mackie,P]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 6. Necessity of Kinds
11907 Maybe the identity of kinds is necessary, but instances being of that kind is not [Mackie,P]