19 ideas
18009 | Chomsky established the view that category mistakes are well-formed but meaningless [Chomsky, by Magidor] |
19682 | Internalists are much more interested in evidence than externalists are [McGrew] |
19687 | Absence of evidence proves nothing, and weird claims need special evidence [McGrew] |
19684 | Does spotting a new possibility count as evidence? [McGrew] |
19688 | Every event is highly unlikely (in detail), but may be perfectly plausible [McGrew] |
19686 | Criminal law needs two separate witnesses, but historians will accept one witness [McGrew] |
19680 | Maybe all evidence consists of beliefs, rather than of facts [McGrew] |
19681 | If all evidence is propositional, what is the evidence for the proposition? Do we face a regress? [McGrew] |
19689 | Several unreliable witnesses can give good support, if they all say the same thing [McGrew] |
19683 | Narrow evidentialism relies wholly on propositions; the wider form includes other items [McGrew] |
22179 | Explanatory facts also predict, and predictive facts also explain [Hempel, by Okasha] |
19685 | Falsificationism would be naive if even a slight discrepancy in evidence killed a theory [McGrew] |
21507 | Scientific explanation aims at a unifying account of underlying structures and processes [Hempel] |
6755 | For Hempel, explanations are deductive-nomological or probabilistic-statistical [Hempel, by Bird] |
17083 | The covering-law model is for scientific explanation; historical explanation is quite different [Hempel] |
13052 | Hempel rejects causation as part of explanation [Hempel, by Salmon] |
6649 | Chomsky now says concepts are basically innate, as well as syntax [Chomsky, by Lowe] |
18007 | Syntax is independent of semantics; sentences can be well formed but meaningless [Chomsky, by Magidor] |
18006 | Chomsky's 'interpretative semantics' says syntax comes first, and is then interpreted [Chomsky, by Magidor] |