Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Carl Hempel, P. Johnson-Laird and Giuseppe Peano

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13 ideas

6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
Numbers have been defined in terms of 'successors' to the concept of 'zero' [Peano, by Blackburn]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
All models of Peano axioms are isomorphic, so the models all seem equally good for natural numbers [Cartwright,R on Peano]
PA concerns any entities which satisfy the axioms [Peano, by Bostock]
Peano axioms not only support arithmetic, but are also fairly obvious [Peano, by Russell]
0 is a non-successor number, all successors are numbers, successors can't duplicate, if P(n) and P(n+1) then P(all-n) [Peano, by Flew]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
We can add Reflexion Principles to Peano Arithmetic, which assert its consistency or soundness [Halbach on Peano]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Arithmetic can have even simpler logical premises than the Peano Axioms [Russell on Peano]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
Explanatory facts also predict, and predictive facts also explain [Hempel, by Okasha]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 7. Scientific Models
The models we use in reasoning may be more like perceptions than like language [Johnson-Laird]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
Scientific explanation aims at a unifying account of underlying structures and processes [Hempel]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
For Hempel, explanations are deductive-nomological or probabilistic-statistical [Hempel, by Bird]
The covering-law model is for scientific explanation; historical explanation is quite different [Hempel]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Hempel rejects causation as part of explanation [Hempel, by Salmon]