25 ideas
21829 | Philosophy aims to understand how things (broadly understood) hang together (broadly understood) [Sellars] |
8472 | Sentential logic is consistent (no contradictions) and complete (entirely provable) [Orenstein] |
8476 | Axiomatization simply picks from among the true sentences a few to play a special role [Orenstein] |
8480 | S4: 'poss that poss that p' implies 'poss that p'; S5: 'poss that nec that p' implies 'nec that p' [Orenstein] |
8474 | Unlike elementary logic, set theory is not complete [Orenstein] |
8465 | Mereology has been exploited by some nominalists to achieve the effects of set theory [Orenstein] |
8452 | Traditionally, universal sentences had existential import, but were later treated as conditional claims [Orenstein] |
8475 | The substitution view of quantification says a sentence is true when there is a substitution instance [Orenstein] |
8454 | The whole numbers are 'natural'; 'rational' numbers include fractions; the 'reals' include root-2 etc. [Orenstein] |
8473 | The logicists held that is-a-member-of is a logical constant, making set theory part of logic [Orenstein] |
6550 | Reduction requires that an object's properties consist of its constituents' properties and relations [Sellars] |
8458 | Just individuals in Nominalism; add sets for Extensionalism; add properties, concepts etc for Intensionalism [Orenstein] |
8793 | If observation is knowledge, it is not just an experience; it is a justification in the space of reasons [Sellars] |
8792 | Observations like 'this is green' presuppose truths about what is a reliable symptom of what [Sellars] |
22179 | Explanatory facts also predict, and predictive facts also explain [Hempel, by Okasha] |
8457 | The Principle of Conservatism says we should violate the minimum number of background beliefs [Orenstein] |
21507 | Scientific explanation aims at a unifying account of underlying structures and processes [Hempel] |
17083 | The covering-law model is for scientific explanation; historical explanation is quite different [Hempel] |
6755 | For Hempel, explanations are deductive-nomological or probabilistic-statistical [Hempel, by Bird] |
13052 | Hempel rejects causation as part of explanation [Hempel, by Salmon] |
6382 | The 'grain problem' says physical objects are granular, where sensations appear not to be [Sellars, by Polger] |
8791 | The concept of 'green' involves a battery of other concepts [Sellars] |
8477 | People presume meanings exist because they confuse meaning and reference [Orenstein] |
8471 | Three ways for 'Socrates is human' to be true are nominalist, platonist, or Montague's way [Orenstein] |
8484 | If two people believe the same proposition, this implies the existence of propositions [Orenstein] |