43 ideas
2666 | Carneades' pinnacles of philosophy are the basis of knowledge (the criterion of truth) and the end of appetite (good) [Carneades, by Cicero] |
21390 | Future events are true if one day we will say 'this event is happening now' [Carneades] |
21672 | We say future things are true that will possess actuality at some following time [Carneades, by Cicero] |
16050 | The goodness of a picture supervenes on the picture; duplicates must be equally good [Hare] |
12132 | Indiscernibility is a necessary and sufficient condition for identity [Brody] |
15834 | Brody bases sortal essentialism on properties required throughout something's existence [Brody, by Mackie,P] |
12140 | Modern emphasis is on properties had essentially; traditional emphasis is on sort-defining properties [Brody] |
11895 | A sortal essence is a property which once possessed always possessed [Brody, by Mackie,P] |
12141 | Maybe essential properties are those which determine a natural kind? [Brody] |
12137 | De re essentialism standardly says all possible objects identical with a have a's essential properties [Brody] |
12142 | Essentially, a has P, always had P, must have had P, and has never had a future without P [Brody] |
12143 | An object having a property essentially is equivalent to its having it necessarily [Brody] |
12144 | Essentialism is justified if the essential properties of things explain their other properties [Brody] |
12139 | Mereological essentialism says that every part that ensures the existence is essential [Brody] |
12135 | Interrupted objects have two first moments of existence, which could be two beginnings [Brody] |
15825 | Carneades denied the transitivity of identity [Carneades, by Chisholm] |
12130 | a and b share all properties; so they share being-identical-with-a; so a = b [Brody] |
21389 | Carneades distinguished logical from causal necessity, when talking of future events [Long on Carneades] |
12138 | Identity across possible worlds is prior to rigid designation [Brody] |
21671 | Voluntary motion is intrinsically within our power, and this power is its cause [Carneades, by Cicero] |
21391 | Some actions are within our power; determinism needs prior causes for everything - so it is false [Carneades, by Cicero] |
21674 | Even Apollo can only foretell the future when it is naturally necessary [Carneades, by Cicero] |
2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
2855 | In primary evaluative words like 'ought' prescription is constant but description can vary [Hare, by Hooker,B] |
22331 | Moral statements are imperatives rather than the avowals of emotion - but universalisable [Hare, by Glock] |
22484 | Universalised prescriptivism could be seen as implying utilitarianism [Hare, by Foot] |
4125 | Hare says I acquire an agglomeration of preferences by role-reversal, leading to utilitarianism [Hare, by Williams,B] |
4126 | If we have to want the preferences of the many, we have to abandon our own deeply-held views [Williams,B on Hare] |
4127 | If morality is to be built on identification with the preferences of others, I must agree with their errors [Williams,B on Hare] |
22483 | A judgement is presciptive if we expect it to be acted on [Hare] |
2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
7398 | Carneades said that after a shipwreck a wise man would seize the only plank by force [Carneades, by Tuck] |
4360 | By far the easiest way of seeming upright is to be upright [Hare] |
2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |
6449 | The categorical imperative leads to utilitarianism [Hare, by Nagel] |
21392 | People change laws for advantage; either there is no justice, or it is a form of self-injury [Carneades, by Lactantius] |