Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Carneades, Julia Annas and Fred Dretske

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40 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / b. Pre-Socratic philosophy
Xenophanes began the concern with knowledge [Annas]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / c. Classical philosophy
Plato was the first philosopher who was concerned to systematize his ideas [Annas]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Carneades' pinnacles of philosophy are the basis of knowledge (the criterion of truth) and the end of appetite (good) [Carneades, by Cicero]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 10. Making Future Truths
Future events are true if one day we will say 'this event is happening now' [Carneades]
We say future things are true that will possess actuality at some following time [Carneades, by Cicero]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Carneades denied the transitivity of identity [Carneades, by Chisholm]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Carneades distinguished logical from causal necessity, when talking of future events [Long on Carneades]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Belief is the power of metarepresentation [Dretske]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / f. Animal beliefs
A mouse hearing a piano played does not believe it, because it lacks concepts and understanding [Dretske]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
You have knowledge if you can rule out all the relevant alternatives to what you believe [Dretske, by DeRose]
Closure says if you know P, and also know P implies Q, then you must know Q [Dretske]
We needn't regret the implications of our regrets; regretting drinking too much implies the past is real [Dretske]
Reasons for believing P may not transmit to its implication, Q [Dretske]
Knowing by visual perception is not the same as knowing by implication [Dretske]
The only way to preserve our homely truths is to abandon closure [Dretske]
P may imply Q, but evidence for P doesn't imply evidence for Q, so closure fails [Dretske]
We know past events by memory, but we don't know the past is real (an implication) by memory [Dretske]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind
Representations are in the head, but their content is not, as stories don't exist in their books [Dretske]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
Some activities are performed better without consciousness of them [Dretske]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
Qualia are just the properties objects are represented as having [Dretske]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
In a representational theory of mind, introspection is displaced perception [Dretske]
Introspection is the same as the experience one is introspecting [Dretske]
Introspection does not involve looking inwards [Dretske]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
Voluntary motion is intrinsically within our power, and this power is its cause [Carneades, by Cicero]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Some actions are within our power; determinism needs prior causes for everything - so it is false [Carneades, by Cicero]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
Even Apollo can only foretell the future when it is naturally necessary [Carneades, by Cicero]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
A representational theory of the mind is an externalist theory of the mind [Dretske]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
All mental facts are representation, which consists of informational functions [Dretske]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
'Phronesis' should translate as 'practical intelligence', not as prudence [Annas]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Euripides's Medea is a key case of reason versus the passions [Annas]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Carneades said that after a shipwreck a wise man would seize the only plank by force [Carneades, by Tuck]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
Epicureans achieve pleasure through character development [Annas]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 3. Cyrenaic School
Cyrenaics pursue pleasure, but don't equate it with happiness [Annas]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Virtue is a kind of understanding of moral value [Annas]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Ancient ethics uses attractive notions, not imperatives [Annas]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Principles cover life as a whole, where rules just cover actions [Annas]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Virtue theory tries to explain our duties in terms of our character [Annas]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
If excessively good actions are admirable but not required, then duty isn't basic [Annas]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
We should do good when necessary, not maximise it [Annas]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
People change laws for advantage; either there is no justice, or it is a form of self-injury [Carneades, by Lactantius]