37 ideas
| 17729 | Examining concepts can recover information obtained through the senses [Jenkins] |
| 17740 | Instead of correspondence of proposition to fact, look at correspondence of its parts [Jenkins] |
| 9065 | S5 collapses iterated modalities (◊□P→□P, and ◊◊P→◊P) [Keefe/Smith] |
| 17730 | Combining the concepts of negation and finiteness gives the concept of infinity [Jenkins] |
| 17719 | Arithmetic concepts are indispensable because they accurately map the world [Jenkins] |
| 17717 | Senses produce concepts that map the world, and arithmetic is known through these concepts [Jenkins] |
| 17724 | It is not easy to show that Hume's Principle is analytic or definitive in the required sense [Jenkins] |
| 17727 | We can learn about the world by studying the grounding of our concepts [Jenkins] |
| 17720 | There's essential, modal, explanatory, conceptual, metaphysical and constitutive dependence [Jenkins, by PG] |
| 9064 | Objects such as a cloud or Mount Everest seem to have fuzzy boundaries in nature [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9044 | If someone is borderline tall, no further information is likely to resolve the question [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9048 | The simplest approach, that vagueness is just ignorance, retains classical logic and semantics [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9055 | The epistemic view of vagueness must explain why we don't know the predicate boundary [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9049 | Supervaluationism keeps true-or-false where precision can be produced, but not otherwise [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9056 | Vague statements lack truth value if attempts to make them precise fail [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9058 | Some of the principles of classical logic still fail with supervaluationism [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9059 | The semantics of supervaluation (e.g. disjunction and quantification) is not classical [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9060 | Supervaluation misunderstands vagueness, treating it as a failure to make things precise [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9050 | A third truth-value at borderlines might be 'indeterminate', or a value somewhere between 0 and 1 [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9061 | People can't be placed in a precise order according to how 'nice' they are [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9062 | If truth-values for vagueness range from 0 to 1, there must be someone who is 'completely tall' [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9063 | How do we decide if my coat is red to degree 0.322 or 0.321? [Keefe/Smith] |
| 17728 | The concepts we have to use for categorising are ones which map the real world well [Jenkins] |
| 14596 | Call 'nominalism' the denial of numbers, properties, relations and sets [Dorr] |
| 14597 | Natural Class Nominalism says there are primitive classes of things resembling in one respect [Dorr] |
| 9045 | Vague predicates involve uncertain properties, uncertain objects, and paradoxes of gradual change [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9047 | Many vague predicates are multi-dimensional; 'big' involves height and volume; heaps include arrangement [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9053 | If there is a precise borderline area, that is not a case of vagueness [Keefe/Smith] |
| 14598 | Abstracta imply non-logical brute necessities, so only nominalists can deny such things [Dorr] |
| 17726 | Examining accurate, justified or grounded concepts brings understanding of the world [Jenkins] |
| 17734 | It is not enough that intuition be reliable - we need to know why it is reliable [Jenkins] |
| 17723 | Knowledge is true belief which can be explained just by citing the proposition believed [Jenkins] |
| 17718 | Grounded concepts are trustworthy maps of the world [Jenkins] |
| 17739 | The physical effect of world on brain explains the concepts we possess [Jenkins] |
| 17731 | Verificationism is better if it says meaningfulness needs concepts grounded in the senses [Jenkins] |
| 17732 | Success semantics explains representation in terms of success in action [Jenkins] |
| 17725 | 'Analytic' can be conceptual, or by meaning, or predicate inclusion, or definition... [Jenkins] |