Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Catherine Z. Elgin, Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J and Alfred North Whitehead

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20 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / c. Classical philosophy
European philosophy consists of a series of footnotes to Plato [Whitehead]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
How can multiple statements, none of which is tenable, conjoin to yield a tenable conclusion? [Elgin]
Statements that are consistent, cotenable and supportive are roughly true [Elgin]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
With 'extensive connection', boundary elements are not included in domains [Whitehead, by Varzi]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
In Whitehead 'processes' consist of events beginning and ending [Whitehead, by Simons]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Coherence is a justification if truth is its best explanation (not skill in creating fiction) [Elgin]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Whitehead held that perception was a necessary feature of all causation [Whitehead, by Harré/Madden]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
Whitehead replaced points with extended regions [Whitehead, by Quine]