19 ideas
9327 | Organisms understand their worlds better if they understand themselves [Gulick] |
19259 | If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis [Vaidya] |
19262 | Essential properties are necessary, but necessary properties may not be essential [Vaidya] |
19267 | Define conceivable; how reliable is it; does inconceivability help; and what type of possibility results? [Vaidya] |
19440 | How do you know you have conceived a thing deeply enough to assess its possibility? [Vaidya] |
19268 | Inconceivability (implying impossibility) may be failure to conceive, or incoherence [Vaidya] |
9325 | In contrast with knowledge, the notion of understanding emphasizes practical engagement [Gulick] |
19265 | Can you possess objective understanding without realising it? [Vaidya] |
9326 | Knowing-that is a much richer kind of knowing-how [Gulick] |
19260 | Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya] |
19266 | In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya] |
9319 | Is consciousness a type of self-awareness, or is being self-aware a way of being conscious? [Gulick] |
9320 | Higher-order theories divide over whether the higher level involves thought or perception [Gulick] |
9321 | Higher-order models reduce the problem of consciousness to intentionality [Gulick] |
9322 | Maybe qualia only exist at the lower level, and a higher-level is needed for what-it-is-like [Gulick] |
19264 | Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental [Vaidya] |
1868 | The world was made as much for animals as for man [Celsus] |
9324 | From the teleopragmatic perspective, life is largely an informational process [Gulick] |
1867 | Christians presented Jesus as a new kind of logos to oppose that of the philosophers [Celsus] |