105 ideas
3099 | Inference is never a conscious process [Harman] |
19304 | The rules of reasoning are not the rules of logic [Harman] |
19306 | It is a principle of reasoning not to clutter your mind with trivialities [Harman] |
19307 | If there is a great cost to avoiding inconsistency, we learn to reason our way around it [Harman] |
19309 | Logic has little relevance to reasoning, except when logical conclusions are immediate [Harman] |
6950 | You can be rational with undetected or minor inconsistencies [Harman] |
3077 | Reasoning might be defined in terms of its functional role, which is to produce knowledge [Harman] |
19303 | Implication just accumulates conclusions, but inference may also revise our views [Harman] |
12596 | Reasoning aims at increasing explanatory coherence [Harman] |
12599 | Reason conservatively: stick to your beliefs, and prefer reasoning that preserves most of them [Harman] |
6954 | A coherent conceptual scheme contains best explanations of most of your beliefs [Harman] |
3092 | If you believe that some of your beliefs are false, then at least one of your beliefs IS false [Harman] |
9550 | We only know relational facts about the empty set, but nothing intrinsic [Chihara] |
9562 | In simple type theory there is a hierarchy of null sets [Chihara] |
9572 | Realists about sets say there exists a null set in the real world, with no members [Chihara] |
9573 | The null set is a structural position which has no other position in membership relation [Chihara] |
9551 | What is special about Bill Clinton's unit set, in comparison with all the others? [Chihara] |
9549 | The set theorist cannot tell us what 'membership' is [Chihara] |
9571 | ZFU refers to the physical world, when it talks of 'urelements' [Chihara] |
18151 | Could we replace sets by the open sentences that define them? [Chihara, by Bostock] |
8758 | We could talk of open sentences, instead of sets [Chihara, by Shapiro] |
9563 | A pack of wolves doesn't cease when one member dies [Chihara] |
3093 | Any two states are logically linked, by being entailed by their conjunction [Harman] |
12595 | We have a theory of logic (implication and inconsistency), but not of inference or reasoning [Harman] |
3098 | Deductive logic is the only logic there is [Harman] |
3094 | You don't have to accept the conclusion of a valid argument [Harman] |
3084 | Our underlying predicates represent words in the language, not universal concepts [Harman] |
3080 | Logical form is the part of a sentence structure which involves logical elements [Harman] |
3081 | A theory of truth in a language must involve a theory of logical form [Harman] |
12597 | I might accept P and Q as likely, but reject P-and-Q as unlikely [Harman] |
9561 | The mathematics of relations is entirely covered by ordered pairs [Chihara] |
9552 | Sentences are consistent if they can all be true; for Frege it is that no contradiction can be deduced [Chihara] |
9553 | Analytic geometry gave space a mathematical structure, which could then have axioms [Chihara] |
10192 | We can replace existence of sets with possibility of constructing token sentences [Chihara, by MacBride] |
10265 | Chihara's system is a variant of type theory, from which he can translate sentences [Chihara, by Shapiro] |
8759 | We can replace type theory with open sentences and a constructibility quantifier [Chihara, by Shapiro] |
10264 | Introduce a constructibility quantifiers (Cx)Φ - 'it is possible to construct an x such that Φ' [Chihara, by Shapiro] |
12598 | Reality is the overlap of true complete theories [Harman] |
9559 | If a successful theory confirms mathematics, presumably a failed theory disconfirms it? [Chihara] |
9566 | No scientific explanation would collapse if mathematical objects were shown not to exist [Chihara] |
19305 | The Gambler's Fallacy (ten blacks, so red is due) overemphasises the early part of a sequence [Harman] |
19310 | High probability premises need not imply high probability conclusions [Harman] |
19308 | We strongly desire to believe what is true, even though logic does not require it [Harman] |
3100 | You have to reaffirm all your beliefs when you make a logical inference [Harman] |
3088 | Analyticity is postulated because we can't imagine some things being true, but we may just lack imagination [Harman] |
3089 | Only lack of imagination makes us think that 'cats are animals' is analytic [Harman] |
3101 | Memories are not just preserved, they are constantly reinferred [Harman] |
3074 | People's reasons for belief are rarely conscious [Harman] |
3097 | We don't distinguish between accepting, and accepting as evidence [Harman] |
6369 | In negative coherence theories, beliefs are prima facie justified, and don't need initial reasons [Harman, by Pollock/Cruz] |
19311 | In revision of belief, we need to keep track of justifications for foundations, but not for coherence [Harman] |
19312 | Coherence is intelligible connections, especially one element explaining another [Harman] |
3096 | Coherence avoids scepticism, because it doesn't rely on unprovable foundations [Harman] |
8800 | If you would deny a truth if you know the full evidence, then knowledge has social aspects [Harman, by Sosa] |
6955 | Enumerative induction is inference to the best explanation [Harman] |
3095 | Induction is an attempt to increase the coherence of our explanations [Harman] |
6952 | Induction is 'defeasible', since additional information can invalidate it [Harman] |
6953 | All reasoning is inductive, and deduction only concerns implication [Harman] |
17060 | Best Explanation is the core notion of epistemology [Harman, by Smart] |
12602 | There is no natural border between inner and outer [Harman] |
12603 | We can only describe mental attitudes in relation to the external world [Harman] |
8130 | Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge] |
12601 | The way things look is a relational matter, not an intrinsic matter [Harman] |
3073 | We see ourselves in the world as a map [Harman] |
3076 | Defining dispositions is circular [Harman] |
3075 | Could a cloud have a headache if its particles formed into the right pattern? [Harman] |
6951 | Ordinary rationality is conservative, starting from where your beliefs currently are [Harman] |
3086 | Are there any meanings apart from in a language? [Harman] |
12592 | Concepts in thought have content, but not meaning, which requires communication [Harman] |
9568 | I prefer the open sentences of a Constructibility Theory, to Platonist ideas of 'equivalence classes' [Chihara] |
3078 | Speech acts, communication, representation and truth form a single theory [Harman] |
12590 | Take meaning to be use in calculation with concepts, rather than in communication [Harman] |
12593 | The use theory attaches meanings to words, not to sentences [Harman] |
12588 | Meaning from use of thoughts, constructed from concepts, which have a role relating to reality [Harman] |
12589 | Some regard conceptual role semantics as an entirely internal matter [Harman] |
12600 | The content of thought is relations, between mental states, things in the world, and contexts [Harman] |
3090 | There is only similarity in meaning, never sameness in meaning [Harman] |
3082 | Ambiguity is when different underlying truth-conditional structures have the same surface form [Harman] |
9547 | Mathematical entities are causally inert, so the causal theory of reference won't work for them [Chihara] |
3079 | Truth in a language is explained by how the structural elements of a sentence contribute to its truth conditions [Harman] |
3085 | Sentences are different from propositions, since two sentences can express one proposition [Harman] |
3087 | The analytic/synthetic distinction is a silly division of thought into encyclopaedia and dictionary [Harman] |
12594 | If one proposition negates the other, which is the negative one? [Harman] |
12591 | Mastery of a language requires thinking, and not just communication [Harman] |
3083 | Many predicates totally resist translation, so a universal underlying structure to languages is unlikely [Harman] |
5121 | Basing ethics on flourishing makes it consequentialist, as actions are judged by contributing to it [Harman] |
23529 | Conduct is not isolated from its effect on the moral code [Hart,HLA] |
5122 | Maybe consequentialism is a critique of ordinary morality, rather than describing it [Harman] |
5120 | What counts as 'flourishing' must be relative to various sets of values [Harman] |
5123 | Maybe there is no such thing as character, and the virtues and vices said to accompany it [Harman] |
5124 | If a person's two acts of timidity have different explanations, they are not one character trait [Harman] |
5125 | Virtue ethics might involve judgements about the virtues of actions, rather than character [Harman] |
23530 | The great danger of democracy is that the oppression of the minority becomes unobjectionable [Hart,HLA] |
23522 | In an organised society all actions have some effect on other people [Hart,HLA] |
23528 | The value of liberty allows freedom of action, even if that distresses other people [Hart,HLA] |
21004 | Hart (against Bentham) says human rights are what motivate legal rights [Hart,HLA, by Sen] |
23523 | The principle of legality requires crimes to be precisely defined in advance of any action [Hart,HLA] |
23524 | Some private moral issues are no concern of the law [Hart,HLA] |
23521 | Do morals influence law? Is morality an aspect of law? Can law be morally criticised? [Hart,HLA] |
23525 | Is the enforcement of morality morally justifiable? [Hart,HLA] |
23526 | Modern law still suppresses practices seen as immoral, and yet harmless [Hart,HLA] |
20932 | Positive law needs secondary 'rules of recognition' for their correct application [Hart,HLA, by Zimmermann,J] |
20931 | Hart replaced positivism with the democratic requirement of the people's acceptance [Hart,HLA, by Zimmermann,J] |
23527 | Moral wickedness of an offence is always relevant to the degree of punishment [Hart,HLA] |
9574 | 'Gunk' is an individual possessing no parts that are atoms [Chihara] |