Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Charles Darwin, PG and Hilary Putnam

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350 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
For ancient Greeks being wise was an ethical value [Putnam]
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 3. Greek-English Lexicon
Agathon: good [PG]
Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness [PG]
Aitia / aition: cause, explanation [PG]
Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will [PG]
Aletheia: truth [PG]
Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance [PG]
Ananke: necessity [PG]
Antikeimenon: object [PG]
Apatheia: unemotional [PG]
Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite [PG]
Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction [PG]
Apodeixis: demonstration [PG]
Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly [PG]
Arche: first principle, the basic [PG]
Arete: virtue, excellence [PG]
Chronismos: separation [PG]
Diairesis: division [PG]
Dialectic: dialectic, discussion [PG]
Dianoia: intellection [cf. Noesis] [PG]
Diaphora: difference [PG]
Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice [PG]
Doxa: opinion, belief [PG]
Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity [PG]
Eidos: form, idea [PG]
Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation [PG]
Empeiron: experience [PG]
Energeia: employment, actuality, power? [PG]
Enkrateia: control [PG]
Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end [PG]
Epagoge: induction, explanation [PG]
Episteme: knowledge, understanding [PG]
Epithumia: appetite [PG]
Ergon: function [PG]
Eristic: polemic, disputation [PG]
Eros: love [PG]
Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment [PG]
Genos: type, genus [PG]
Hexis: state, habit [PG]
Horismos: definition [PG]
Hule: matter [PG]
Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing [cf. Tode ti] [PG]
Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility [PG]
Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially [PG]
Kinesis: movement, process [PG]
Kosmos: order, universe [PG]
Logos: reason, account, word [PG]
Meson: the mean [PG]
Metechein: partaking, sharing [PG]
Mimesis: imitation, fine art [PG]
Morphe: form [PG]
Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] [PG]
Nomos: convention, law, custom [PG]
Nous: intuition, intellect, understanding [PG]
Orexis: desire [PG]
Ousia: substance, (primary) being, [see 'Prote ousia'] [PG]
Pathos: emotion, affection, property [PG]
Phantasia: imagination [PG]
Philia: friendship [PG]
Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom [PG]
Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense [PG]
Physis: nature [PG]
Praxis: action, activity [PG]
Prote ousia: primary being [PG]
Psuche: mind, soul, life [PG]
Sophia: wisdom [PG]
Sophrosune: moderation, self-control [PG]
Stoicheia: elements [PG]
Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism [PG]
Techne: skill, practical knowledge [PG]
Telos: purpose, end [PG]
Theoria: contemplation [PG]
Theos: god [PG]
Ti esti: what-something-is, essence [PG]
Timoria: vengeance, punishment [PG]
To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be [PG]
To ti estin: essence [PG]
Tode ti: this-such, subject of predication [cf. hupokeimenon] [PG]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / a. Ancient chronology
323 (roughly): Euclid wrote 'Elements', summarising all of geometry [PG]
1000 (roughly): Upanishads written (in Sanskrit); religious and philosophical texts [PG]
750 (roughly): the Book of Genesis written by Hebrew writers [PG]
586: eclipse of the sun on the coast of modern Turkey was predicted by Thales of Miletus [PG]
570: Anaximander flourished in Miletus [PG]
563: the Buddha born in northern India [PG]
540: Lao Tzu wrote 'Tao Te Ching', the basis of Taoism [PG]
529: Pythagoras created his secretive community at Croton in Sicily [PG]
500: Heraclitus flourishes at Ephesus, in modern Turkey [PG]
496: Confucius travels widely, persuading rulers to be more moral [PG]
472: Empedocles persuades his city (Acragas in Sicily) to become a democracy [PG]
450 (roughly): Parmenides and Zeno visit Athens from Italy [PG]
445: Protagoras helps write laws for the new colony of Thurii [PG]
436 (roughly): Anaxagoras is tried for impiety, and expelled from Athens [PG]
170 (roughly): Marcus Aurelius wrote his private stoic meditations [PG]
-200 (roughly): Sextus Empiricus wrote a series of books on scepticism [PG]
263: Porphyry began to study with Plotinus in Rome [PG]
310: Christianity became the official religion of the Roman empire [PG]
387: Ambrose converts Augustine to Christianity [PG]
523: Boethius imprisoned at Pavia, and begins to write [PG]
529: the emperor Justinian closes all the philosophy schools in Athens [PG]
427: Gorgias visited Athens as ambassador for Leontini [PG]
399: Socrates executed (with Plato absent through ill health) [PG]
387 (roughly): Plato returned to Athens, and founded the Academy [PG]
387 (roughly): Aristippus the Elder founder a hedonist school at Cyrene [PG]
367: the teenaged Aristotle came to study at the Academy [PG]
360 (roughly): Diogenes of Sinope lives in a barrel in central Athens [PG]
347: death of Plato [PG]
343: Aristotle becomes tutor to 13 year old Alexander (the Great) [PG]
335: Arisotle founded his school at the Lyceum in Athens [PG]
330 (roughly): Chuang Tzu wrote his Taoist book [PG]
322: Aristotle retired to Chalcis, and died there [PG]
307 (roughly): Epicurus founded his school at the Garden in Athens [PG]
301 (roughly): Zeno of Citium founded Stoicism at the Stoa Poikile in Athens [PG]
261: Cleanthes replaced Zeno as head of the Stoa [PG]
229 (roughly): Chrysippus replaced Cleanthes has head of the Stoa [PG]
157 (roughly): Carneades became head of the Academy [PG]
85: most philosophical activity moves to Alexandria [PG]
78: Cicero visited the stoic school on Rhodes [PG]
60 (roughly): Lucretius wrote his Latin poem on epicureanism [PG]
65: Seneca forced to commit suicide by Nero [PG]
80: the discourses of the stoic Epictetus are written down [PG]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 3. Earlier European Philosophy / a. Earlier European chronology
1090: Anselm publishes his proof of the existence of God [PG]
622 (roughly): Mohammed writes the Koran [PG]
642: Arabs close the philosophy schools in Alexandria [PG]
910 (roughly): Al-Farabi wrote Arabic commentaries on Aristotle [PG]
1015 (roughly): Ibn Sina (Avicenna) writes a book on Aristotle [PG]
1115: Abelard is the chief logic teacher in Paris [PG]
1166: Ibn Rushd (Averroes) wrote extensive commentaries on Aristotle [PG]
1266: Aquinas began writing 'Summa Theologica' [PG]
1280: after his death, the teaching of Aquinas becomes official Dominican doctrine [PG]
1328: William of Ockham decides the Pope is a heretic, and moves to Munich [PG]
1347: the Church persecutes philosophical heresies [PG]
1470: Marsilio Ficino founds a Platonic Academy in Florence [PG]
1513: Machiavelli wrote 'The Prince' [PG]
1543: Copernicus publishes his heliocentric view of the solar system [PG]
1580: Montaigne publishes his essays [PG]
1600: Giordano Bruno was burned at the stake in Rome [PG]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / a. Later European chronology
1619: Descartes's famous day of meditation inside a stove [PG]
1620: Bacon publishes 'Novum Organum' [PG]
1633: Galileo convicted of heresy by the Inquisition [PG]
1641: Descartes publishes his 'Meditations' [PG]
1650: death of Descartes, in Stockholm [PG]
1651: Hobbes publishes 'Leviathan' [PG]
1662: the Port Royal Logic is published [PG]
1665: Spinoza writes his 'Ethics' [PG]
1676: Leibniz settled as librarian to the Duke of Brunswick [PG]
1687: Newton publishes his 'Principia Mathematica' [PG]
1690: Locke publishes his 'Essay' [PG]
1697: Bayle publishes his 'Dictionary' [PG]
1713: Berkeley publishes his 'Three Dialogues' [PG]
1734: Voltaire publishes his 'Philosophical Letters' [PG]
1739: Hume publishes his 'Treatise' [PG]
1762: Rousseau publishes his 'Social Contract' [PG]
1781: Kant publishes his 'Critique of Pure Reason' [PG]
1785: Reid publishes his essays defending common sense [PG]
1798: the French Revolution [PG]
1807: Hegel publishes his 'Phenomenology of Spirit' [PG]
1818: Schopenhauer publishes his 'World as Will and Idea' [PG]
1840: Kierkegaard is writing extensively in Copenhagen [PG]
1843: Mill publishes his 'System of Logic' [PG]
1848: Marx and Engels publis the Communist Manifesto [PG]
1859: Darwin publishes his 'Origin of the Species' [PG]
1861: Mill publishes 'Utilitarianism' [PG]
1867: Marx begins publishing 'Das Kapital' [PG]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / a. Modern philosophy chronology
1879: Peirce taught for five years at Johns Hopkins University [PG]
1879: Frege invents predicate logic [PG]
1892: Frege's essay 'Sense and Reference' [PG]
1884: Frege publishes his 'Foundations of Arithmetic' [PG]
1885: Nietzsche completed 'Thus Spake Zarathustra' [PG]
1888: Dedekind publishes axioms for arithmetic [PG]
1890: James published 'Principles of Psychology' [PG]
1895 (roughly): Freud developed theories of the unconscious [PG]
1900: Husserl began developing Phenomenology [PG]
1953: Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations' [PG]
1956: Place proposed mind-brain identity [PG]
1962: Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions' [PG]
1967: Putnam proposed functionalism of the mind [PG]
1971: Rawls's 'A Theory of Justice' [PG]
1972: Kripke publishes 'Naming and Necessity' [PG]
1975: Singer publishes 'Animal Rights' [PG]
1975: Putnam published his Twin Earth example [PG]
1986: David Lewis publishes 'On the Plurality of Worlds' [PG]
1903: Moore published 'Principia Ethica' [PG]
1904: Dewey became professor at Columbia University [PG]
1908: Zermelo publishes axioms for set theory [PG]
1910: Russell and Whitehead begin publishing 'Principia Mathematica' [PG]
1912: Russell meets Wittgenstein in Cambridge [PG]
1921: Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' published [PG]
1927: Heidegger's 'Being and Time' published [PG]
1930: Frank Ramsey dies at 27 [PG]
1931: Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems [PG]
1933: Tarski's theory of truth [PG]
1942: Camus published 'The Myth of Sisyphus' [PG]
1943: Sartre's 'Being and Nothingness' [PG]
1945: Merleau-Ponty's 'Phenomenology of Perception' [PG]
1947: Carnap published 'Meaning and Necessity' [PG]
1950: Quine's essay 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' [PG]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
The job of the philosopher is to distinguish facts about the world from conventions [Putnam]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Note that "is" can assert existence, or predication, or identity, or classification [PG]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
Realism is the only philosophy of science that doesn't make the success of science a miracle [Putnam]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
'True' and 'refers' cannot be made scientically precise, but are fundamental to science [Putnam]
A culture needs to admit that knowledge is more extensive than just 'science' [Putnam]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
Fallacies are errors in reasoning, 'formal' if a clear rule is breached, and 'informal' if more general [PG]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 3. Question Begging
Question-begging assumes the proposition which is being challenged [PG]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 6. Fallacy of Division
What is true of a set is also true of its members [PG]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
The Ad Hominem Fallacy criticises the speaker rather than the argument [PG]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green [Putnam]
Putnam's epistemic notion of truth replaces the realism of correspondence with ontological relativism [Putnam, by O'Grady]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
We need the correspondence theory of truth to understand language and science [Putnam]
Before Kant, all philosophers had a correspondence theory of truth [Putnam]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
Correspondence between concepts and unconceptualised reality is impossible [Putnam]
The correspondence theory is wrong, because there is no one correspondence between reality and fact [Putnam, by O'Grady]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
Truth is rational acceptability [Putnam]
Truth is an idealisation of rational acceptability [Putnam]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
For scientific purposes there is a precise concept of 'true-in-L', using set theory [Putnam]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language [Putnam]
Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept [Putnam]
Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true' [Putnam]
Semantic notions do not occur in Tarski's definitions, but assessing their correctness involves translation [Putnam]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
Asserting the truth of an indexical statement is not the same as uttering the statement [Putnam]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
Minimal theories of truth avoid ontological commitment to such things as 'facts' or 'reality' [PG]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
Modern notation frees us from Aristotle's restriction of only using two class-names in premises [Putnam]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
The universal syllogism is now expressed as the transitivity of subclasses [Putnam]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / a. Symbols of PC
'⊃' ('if...then') is used with the definition 'Px ⊃ Qx' is short for '¬(Px & ¬Qx)' [Putnam]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / a. Types of set
In type theory, 'x ∈ y' is well defined only if x and y are of the appropriate type [Putnam]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / d. Infinite Sets
We understand some statements about all sets [Putnam]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / o. Axiom of Constructibility V = L
V = L just says all sets are constructible [Putnam]
The Löwenheim-Skolem theorems show that whether all sets are constructible is indeterminate [Putnam, by Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
Before the late 19th century logic was trivialised by not dealing with relations [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
Asserting first-order validity implicitly involves second-order reference to classes [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Unfashionably, I think logic has an empirical foundation [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Putnam coined the term 'if-thenism' [Putnam, by Musgrave]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
We can identify functions with certain sets - or identify sets with certain functions [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Having a valid form doesn't ensure truth, as it may be meaningless [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 6. Intensionalism
Intension is not meaning, as 'cube' and 'square-faced polyhedron' are intensionally the same [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
If cats equal cherries, model theory allows reinterpretation of the whole language preserving truth [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
The Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem is close to an antinomy in philosophy of language [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
Monty Hall Dilemma: do you abandon your preference after Monty eliminates one of the rivals? [PG]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / f. Uncountable infinities
Sets larger than the continuum should be studied in an 'if-then' spirit [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / i. Cardinal infinity
Very large sets should be studied in an 'if-then' spirit [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
I do not believe mathematics either has or needs 'foundations' [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
It is conceivable that the axioms of arithmetic or propositional logic might be changed [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
How can you contemplate Platonic entities without causal transactions with them? [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Maybe mathematics is empirical in that we could try to change it [Putnam]
It is unfashionable, but most mathematical intuitions come from nature [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
Science requires more than consistency of mathematics [Putnam]
Indispensability strongly supports predicative sets, and somewhat supports impredicative sets [Putnam]
We must quantify over numbers for science; but that commits us to their existence [Putnam]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Realists believe truth is correspondence, independent of humans, is bivalent, and is unique [Putnam]
Realism is a theory, which explains the convergence of science and the success of language [Putnam]
Metaphysical realism is committed to there being one ultimate true theory [Putnam]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
It is an illusion to think there could be one good scientific theory of reality [Putnam]
You can't deny a hypothesis a truth-value simply because we may never know it! [Putnam]
Putnam says anti-realism is a bad explanation of accurate predictions [Putnam, by Okasha]
If we try to cure the abundance of theories with causal links, this is 'just more theory' [Putnam, by Lewis]
The sentence 'A cat is on a mat' remains always true when 'cat' means cherry and 'mat' means tree [Putnam]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
A fact is simply what it is rational to accept [Putnam]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
Very nominalistic philosophers deny properties, though scientists accept them [Putnam]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
Nominalism only makes sense if it is materialist [Putnam]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Aristotle says an object (e.g. a lamp) has identity if its parts stay together when it is moved [Putnam]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / b. Need for abstracta
Physics is full of non-physical entities, such as space-vectors [Putnam]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
Shape is essential relative to 'statue', but not essential relative to 'clay' [Putnam]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties [Mackie,P on Putnam]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Putnam smuggles essentialism about liquids into his proof that water must be H2O [Salmon,N on Putnam]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
If necessity is always relative to a description in a language, then there is only 'de dicto' necessity [Putnam, by O'Grady]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Mathematics eliminates possibility, as being simultaneous actuality in sets [Putnam]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
Everything has a probability, something will happen, and probabilities add up [PG]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
A statement can be metaphysically necessary and epistemologically contingent [Putnam]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Conceivability is no proof of possibility [Putnam]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / a. Naïve realism
If reality is just what we perceive, we would have no need for a sixth sense [PG]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
If my team is losing 3-1, I have synthetic a priori knowledge that they need two goals for a draw [PG]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
If a tautology is immune from revision, why would that make it true? [Putnam]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
The old view that sense data are independent of mind is quite dotty [Putnam]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
Knowledge depends on believing others, which must be innate, as inferences are not strong enough [Putnam]
Empathy may not give knowledge, but it can give plausibility or right opinion [Putnam]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Some kind of objective 'rightness' is a presupposition of thought itself [Putnam]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
Most predictions are uninteresting, and are only sought in order to confirm a theory [Putnam]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
Science aims at truth, not at 'simplicity' [Putnam]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
Naïve operationalism would have meanings change every time the tests change [Putnam]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
A false theory could hardly rival the explanatory power of natural selection [Darwin]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
You can't decide which explanations are good if you don't attend to the interest-relative aspects [Putnam]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
The Twin Earth theory suggests that intentionality is independent of qualia [Jacquette on Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
Dispositions need mental terms to define them [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Superactors and superspartans count against behaviourism [Putnam, by Searle]
Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam]
Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam]
Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
Instances of pain are physical tokens, but the nature of pain is more abstract [Putnam, by Lycan]
Functionalism says robots and people are the same at one level of abstraction [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
Is there just one computational state for each specific belief? [Putnam]
Functionalism can't explain reference and truth, which are needed for logic [Putnam]
If concepts have external meaning, computational states won't explain psychology [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
If we are going to eliminate folk psychology, we must also eliminate folk logic [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity [Polger on Putnam]
If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state [Putnam, by Kim]
Maybe a mollusc's brain events for pain ARE of the same type (broadly) as a human's [PG]
Maybe a frog's brain events for fear are functionally like ours, but not phenomenally [PG]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Can we give a scientific, computational account of folk psychology? [Putnam]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
Rationality is one part of our conception of human flourishing [Putnam]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
If everything uses mentalese, ALL concepts must be innate! [Putnam]
No machine language can express generalisations [Putnam]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
If Twins talking about 'water' and 'XYZ' have different thoughts but identical heads, then thoughts aren't in the head [Putnam, by Crane]
We say ice and steam are different forms of water, but not that they are different forms of H2O [Forbes,G on Putnam]
Does 'water' mean a particular substance that was 'dubbed'? [Putnam, by Rey]
'Water' on Twin Earth doesn't refer to water, but no mental difference can account for this [Putnam]
Reference may be different while mental representation is the same [Putnam]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
I can't distinguish elm trees, but I mean by 'elm' the same set of trees as everybody else [Putnam]
'Water' has an unnoticed indexical component, referring to stuff around here [Putnam]
Reference is social not individual, because we defer to experts when referring to elm trees [Putnam]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
Concepts are (at least in part) abilities and not occurrences [Putnam]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Meaning and translation (which are needed to define truth) both presuppose the notion of reference [Putnam]
Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference [Putnam]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation [Putnam]
We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning [Putnam]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
"Meaning is use" is not a definition of meaning [Putnam]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
Holism seems to make fixed definition more or less impossible [Putnam]
Meaning holism tried to show that you can't get fixed meanings built out of observation terms [Putnam]
Understanding a sentence involves background knowledge and can't be done in isolation [Putnam]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
How reference is specified is not what reference is [Putnam]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
We should separate how the reference of 'gold' is fixed from its conceptual content [Putnam]
Like names, natural kind terms have their meaning fixed by extension and reference [Putnam]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
We need to recognise the contribution of society and of the world in determining reference [Putnam]
Neither individual nor community mental states fix reference [Putnam]
Maybe the total mental state of a language community fixes the reference of a term [Putnam]
Aristotle implies that we have the complete concepts of a language in our heads, but we don't [Putnam]
Reference (say to 'elms') is a social phenomenon which we can leave to experts [Putnam]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
Often reference determines sense, and not (as Frege thought) vice versa [Putnam, by Scruton]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions [Putnam]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Language is more like a cooperative steamship than an individual hammer [Putnam]
A private language could work with reference and beliefs, and wouldn't need meaning [Putnam]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
The correct translation is the one that explains the speaker's behaviour [Putnam]
Language maps the world in many ways (because it maps onto other languages in many ways) [Putnam]
There are infinitely many interpretations of a sentence which can all seem to be 'correct' [Putnam]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
You can't say 'most speaker's beliefs are true'; in some areas this is not so, and you can't count beliefs [Putnam]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
The word 'inconsiderate' nicely shows the blurring of facts and values [Putnam]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 4. Unfairness
Utilitarianism seems to justify the discreet murder of unhappy people [PG]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
The hidden structure of a natural kind determines membership in all possible worlds [Putnam]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
Natural kind stereotypes are 'strong' (obvious, like tiger) or 'weak' (obscure, like molybdenum) [Putnam]
"Water" is a natural kind term, but "H2O" is a description [Putnam]
Express natural kinds as a posteriori predicate connections, not as singular terms [Putnam, by Mackie,P]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
An alien might think oxygen was the main cause of a forest fire [Putnam]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
If causes are the essence of diseases, then disease is an example of a relational essence [Putnam, by Williams,NE]
Archimedes meant by 'gold' the hidden structure or essence of the stuff [Putnam]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
If water is H2O in the actual world, there is no possible world where it isn't H2O [Putnam]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
Life is Movement, Respiration, Sensation, Nutrition, Excretion, Reproduction, Growth (MRS NERG) [PG]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
How could God know there wasn't an unknown force controlling his 'free' will? [PG]
An omniscient being couldn't know it was omniscient, as that requires information from beyond its scope of knowledge [PG]