140 ideas
| 3240 | There is more insight in fundamental perplexity about problems than in their supposed solutions [Nagel] |
| 3269 | If your life is to be meaningful as part of some large thing, the large thing must be meaningful [Nagel] |
| 3242 | Philosophy is the childhood of the intellect, and a culture can't skip it [Nagel] |
| 3241 | It seems mad, but the aim of philosophy is to climb outside of our own minds [Nagel] |
| 15390 | Metaphysics attempts to give an account of everything, in terms of categories and principles [Simons] |
| 12865 | Analytic philosophers may prefer formal systems because natural language is such mess [Simons] |
| 1489 | Modern philosophy tends to be a theory-constructing extension of science, but there is also problem-solving [Nagel] |
| 20989 | Views are objective if they don't rely on a person's character, social position or species [Nagel] |
| 22354 | Things cause perceptions, properties have other effects, hence we reach a 'view from nowhere' [Nagel, by Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 3248 | Realism invites scepticism because it claims to be objective [Nagel] |
| 12815 | Classical mereology doesn't apply well to the objects around us [Simons] |
| 12832 | Complement: the rest of the Universe apart from some individual, written x-bar [Simons] |
| 12834 | Criticisms of mereology: parts? transitivity? sums? identity? four-dimensional? [Simons] |
| 12819 | A 'part' has different meanings for individuals, classes, and masses [Simons] |
| 12822 | Proper or improper part: x < y, 'x is (a) part of y' [Simons] |
| 12823 | Overlap: two parts overlap iff they have a part in common, expressed as 'x o y' [Simons] |
| 12824 | Disjoint: two individuals are disjoint iff they do not overlap, written 'x | y' [Simons] |
| 12825 | Product: the product of two individuals is the sum of all of their overlaps, written 'x · y' [Simons] |
| 12826 | Sum: the sum of individuals is what is overlapped if either of them are, written 'x + y' [Simons] |
| 12827 | Difference: the difference of individuals is the remainder of an overlap, written 'x - y' [Simons] |
| 12828 | General sum: the sum of objects satisfying some predicate, written σx(Fx) [Simons] |
| 12829 | General product: the nucleus of all objects satisfying a predicate, written πx(Fx) [Simons] |
| 12830 | Universe: the mereological sum of all objects whatever, written 'U' [Simons] |
| 12831 | Atom: an individual with no proper parts, written 'At x' [Simons] |
| 12844 | Dissective: stuff is dissective if parts of the stuff are always the stuff [Simons] |
| 12813 | Two standard formalisations of part-whole theory are the Calculus of Individuals, and Mereology [Simons] |
| 12816 | Classical mereology doesn't handle temporal or modal notions very well [Simons] |
| 12821 | The part-relation is transitive and asymmetric (and thus irreflexive) [Simons] |
| 18847 | Each wheel is part of a car, but the four wheels are not a further part [Simons] |
| 12846 | A 'group' is a collection with a condition which constitutes their being united [Simons] |
| 12848 | The same members may form two groups [Simons] |
| 12861 | 'The wolves' are the matter of 'the pack'; the latter is a group, with different identity conditions [Simons] |
| 12876 | Philosophy is stuck on the Fregean view that an individual is anything with a proper name [Simons] |
| 12845 | Some natural languages don't distinguish between singular and plural [Simons] |
| 12838 | Four-dimensional ontology has no change, since that needs an object, and time to pass [Simons] |
| 12842 | There are real relational changes, as well as bogus 'Cambridge changes' [Simons] |
| 12841 | I don't believe in processes [Simons] |
| 12836 | Fans of process ontology cheat, since river-stages refer to 'rivers' [Simons] |
| 8979 | Slow and continuous events (like balding or tree-growth) are called 'processes', not 'events' [Simons] |
| 8981 | Maybe processes behave like stuff-nouns, and events like count-nouns [Simons] |
| 12882 | A wave is maintained by a process, but it isn't a process [Simons] |
| 12880 | Moments are things like smiles or skids, which are founded on other things [Simons] |
| 12883 | Moving disturbances are are moments which continuously change their basis [Simons] |
| 12881 | A smiling is an event with causes, but the smile is a continuant without causes [Simons] |
| 12840 | I do not think there is a general identity condition for events [Simons] |
| 8973 | Einstein's relativity brought events into ontology, as the terms of a simultaneity relationships [Simons] |
| 12839 | Relativity has an ontology of things and events, not on space-time diagrams [Simons] |
| 12879 | Independent objects can exist apart, and maybe even entirely alone [Simons] |
| 4242 | Pure supervenience explains nothing, and is a sign of something fundamental we don't know [Nagel] |
| 12847 | Mass nouns admit 'much' and 'a little', and resist 'many' and 'few'. [Simons] |
| 12862 | Gold is not its atoms, because the atoms must be all gold, but gold contains neutrons [Simons] |
| 12863 | Mass terms (unlike plurals) are used with indifference to whether they can exist in units [Simons] |
| 12859 | A mixture can have different qualities from its ingredients. [Simons] |
| 12858 | Mixtures disappear if nearly all of the mixture is one ingredient [Simons] |
| 3291 | Emergent properties appear at high levels of complexity, but aren't explainable by the lower levels [Nagel] |
| 18431 | Internal relations combine some tropes into a nucleus, which bears the non-essential tropes [Simons, by Edwards] |
| 12850 | To individuate something we must pick it out, but also know its limits of variation [Simons] |
| 12860 | Sortal nouns for continuants tell you their continuance- and cessation-conditions [Simons] |
| 12886 | A whole requires some unique relation which binds together all of the parts [Simons] |
| 12835 | Does Tibbles remain the same cat when it loses its tail? [Simons] |
| 12857 | Tibbles isn't Tib-plus-tail, because Tibbles can survive its loss, but the sum can't [Simons] |
| 12820 | Without extensional mereology two objects can occupy the same position [Simons] |
| 12866 | Composition is asymmetric and transitive [Simons] |
| 12867 | A hand constitutes a fist (when clenched), but a fist is not composed of an augmented hand [Simons] |
| 12864 | We say 'b is part of a', 'b is a part of a', 'b are a part of a', or 'b are parts of a'. [Simons] |
| 12814 | Classical mereology says there are 'sums', for whose existence there is no other evidence [Simons] |
| 12817 | 'Mereological extensionality' says objects with the same parts are identical [Simons] |
| 12833 | If there are c atoms, this gives 2^c - 1 individuals, so there can't be just 2 or 12 individuals [Simons] |
| 12849 | Sums are more plausible for pluralities and masses than they are for individuals [Simons] |
| 12877 | Sums of things in different categories are found within philosophy. [Simons] |
| 12888 | The wholeness of a melody seems conventional, but of an explosion it seems natural [Simons] |
| 12871 | Objects have their essential properties because of the kind of objects they are [Simons] |
| 12870 | We must distinguish the de dicto 'must' of propositions from the de re 'must' of essence [Simons] |
| 12873 | Original parts are the best candidates for being essential to artefacts [Simons] |
| 12874 | An essential part of an essential part is an essential part of the whole [Simons] |
| 12837 | Four dimensional-objects are stranger than most people think [Simons] |
| 12856 | Intermittent objects would be respectable if they occurred in nature, as well as in artefacts [Simons] |
| 12885 | Objects like chess games, with gaps in them, are thereby less unified [Simons] |
| 12854 | An entrepreneur and a museum curator would each be happy with their ship at the end [Simons] |
| 12855 | The 'best candidate' theories mistakenly assume there is one answer to 'Which is the real ship?' [Simons] |
| 12872 | The zygote is an essential initial part, for a sexually reproduced organism [Simons] |
| 12889 | The limits of change for an individual depend on the kind of individual [Simons] |
| 3249 | Modern science depends on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities [Nagel] |
| 22429 | We achieve objectivity by dropping secondary qualities, to focus on structural primary qualities [Nagel] |
| 3296 | Sense-data are a false objectification of what is essentially subjective [Nagel] |
| 3247 | Epistemology is centrally about what we should believe, not the definition of knowledge [Nagel] |
| 3271 | We can't control our own beliefs [Nagel] |
| 3270 | Justifications come to an end when we want them to [Nagel] |
| 3252 | Scepticism is based on ideas which scepticism makes impossible [Nagel] |
| 1490 | You would have to be very morally lazy to ignore criticisms of your own culture [Nagel] |
| 3251 | Observed regularities are only predictable if we assume hidden necessity [Nagel] |
| 16861 | A false theory could hardly rival the explanatory power of natural selection [Darwin] |
| 3295 | Inner v outer brings astonishment that we are a particular person [Nagel] |
| 2957 | Brain bisection suggests unity of mind isn't all-or-nothing [Nagel, by Lockwood] |
| 3286 | An organism is conscious if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism [Nagel] |
| 3285 | We may be unable to abandon personal identity, even when split-brains have undermined it [Nagel] |
| 3293 | If you assert that we have an ego, you can still ask if that future ego will be me [Nagel] |
| 3244 | Personal identity cannot be fully known a priori [Nagel] |
| 3245 | The question of whether a future experience will be mine presupposes personal identity [Nagel] |
| 3246 | I can't even conceive of my brain being split in two [Nagel] |
| 3292 | The most difficult problem of free will is saying what the problem is [Nagel] |
| 3288 | Can we describe our experiences to zombies? [Nagel] |
| 4883 | Nagel's title creates an impenetrable mystery, by ignoring a bat's ways that may not be "like" anything [Dennett on Nagel] |
| 3287 | We can't be objective about experience [Nagel] |
| 4989 | Physicalism should explain how subjective experience is possible, but not 'what it is like' [Kirk,R on Nagel] |
| 18883 | Any equivalence relation among similar things allows the creation of an abstractum [Simons] |
| 18884 | Abstraction is usually seen as producing universals and numbers, but it can do more [Simons] |
| 4001 | The meaning of a word contains all its possible uses as well as its actual ones [Nagel] |
| 12843 | With activities if you are doing it you've done it, with performances you must finish to have done it [Simons] |
| 6479 | Noninterference requires justification as much as interference does [Nagel] |
| 12875 | One false note doesn't make it a performance of a different work [Simons] |
| 6450 | Morality must be motivating, and not because of pre-moral motives [Nagel] |
| 3284 | There is no one theory of how to act (or what to believe) [Nagel] |
| 3257 | Total objectivity can't see value, but it sees many people with values [Nagel] |
| 3265 | We don't worry about the time before we were born the way we worry about death [Nagel] |
| 3263 | If our own life lacks meaning, devotion to others won't give it meaning [Nagel] |
| 3256 | Pain doesn't have a further property of badness; it gives a reason for its avoidance [Nagel] |
| 3272 | Moral luck can arise in character, preconditions, actual circumstances, and outcome [Nagel] |
| 6447 | Game theory misses out the motivation arising from the impersonal standpoint [Nagel] |
| 3261 | Something may be 'rational' either because it is required or because it is acceptable [Nagel] |
| 3258 | If cockroaches can't think about their actions, they have no duties [Nagel] |
| 3282 | The general form of moral reasoning is putting yourself in other people's shoes [Nagel] |
| 3294 | As far as possible we should become instruments to realise what is best from an eternal point of view [Nagel] |
| 3254 | If we can decide how to live after stepping outside of ourselves, we have the basis of a moral theory [Nagel] |
| 6446 | In ethics we abstract from our identity, but not from our humanity [Nagel] |
| 3264 | We should see others' viewpoints, but not lose touch with our own values [Nagel] |
| 6477 | I can only universalise a maxim if everyone else could also universalise it [Nagel] |
| 3255 | We find new motives by discovering reasons for action different from our preexisting motives [Nagel] |
| 3262 | Utilitarianism is too demanding [Nagel] |
| 3268 | If a small brief life is absurd, then so is a long and large one [Nagel] |
| 3278 | An egalitarian system must give priority to those with the worst prospects in life [Nagel] |
| 6448 | A legitimate system is one accepted as both impartial and reasonably partial [Nagel] |
| 3275 | Equality was once opposed to aristocracy, but now it opposes public utility and individual rights [Nagel] |
| 3277 | In judging disputes, should we use one standard, or those of each individual? [Nagel] |
| 3281 | The ideal of acceptability to each individual underlies the appeal to equality [Nagel] |
| 3273 | Equality nowadays is seen as political, social, legal and economic [Nagel] |
| 3274 | Equality can either be defended as good for society, or as good for individual rights [Nagel] |
| 6478 | Democracy is opposed to equality, if the poor are not a majority [Nagel] |
| 3276 | A morality of rights is very minimal, leaving a lot of human life without restrictions or duties [Nagel] |
| 3290 | Given the nature of heat and of water, it is literally impossible for water not to boil at the right heat [Nagel] |