54 ideas
| 22664 | I do not care if my trivial beliefs are false, and I have no interest in many truths [Nozick] |
| 22665 | Maybe James was depicting the value of truth, and not its nature [Nozick] |
| 10482 | The logic of ZF is classical first-order predicate logic with identity [Boolos] |
| 10492 | A few axioms of set theory 'force themselves on us', but most of them don't [Boolos] |
| 18192 | Do the Replacement Axioms exceed the iterative conception of sets? [Boolos, by Maddy] |
| 7785 | The use of plurals doesn't commit us to sets; there do not exist individuals and collections [Boolos] |
| 10485 | Naïve sets are inconsistent: there is no set for things that do not belong to themselves [Boolos] |
| 10484 | The iterative conception says sets are formed at stages; some are 'earlier', and must be formed first [Boolos] |
| 13547 | Limitation of Size is weak (Fs only collect is something the same size does) or strong (fewer Fs than objects) [Boolos, by Potter] |
| 10699 | Does a bowl of Cheerios contain all its sets and subsets? [Boolos] |
| 14249 | Boolos reinterprets second-order logic as plural logic [Boolos, by Oliver/Smiley] |
| 10830 | Second-order logic metatheory is set-theoretic, and second-order validity has set-theoretic problems [Boolos] |
| 10225 | Monadic second-order logic might be understood in terms of plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
| 10736 | Boolos showed how plural quantifiers can interpret monadic second-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo] |
| 10780 | Any sentence of monadic second-order logic can be translated into plural first-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo] |
| 10829 | A sentence can't be a truth of logic if it asserts the existence of certain sets [Boolos] |
| 10697 | Identity is clearly a logical concept, and greatly enhances predicate calculus [Boolos] |
| 10832 | '∀x x=x' only means 'everything is identical to itself' if the range of 'everything' is fixed [Boolos] |
| 13671 | Second-order quantifiers are just like plural quantifiers in ordinary language, with no extra ontology [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
| 10267 | We should understand second-order existential quantifiers as plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
| 10698 | Plural forms have no more ontological commitment than to first-order objects [Boolos] |
| 7806 | Boolos invented plural quantification [Boolos, by Benardete,JA] |
| 10834 | Weak completeness: if it is valid, it is provable. Strong: it is provable from a set of sentences [Boolos] |
| 13841 | Why should compactness be definitive of logic? [Boolos, by Hacking] |
| 10491 | Infinite natural numbers is as obvious as infinite sentences in English [Boolos] |
| 10483 | Mathematics and science do not require very high orders of infinity [Boolos] |
| 10833 | Many concepts can only be expressed by second-order logic [Boolos] |
| 10490 | Mathematics isn't surprising, given that we experience many objects as abstract [Boolos] |
| 10700 | First- and second-order quantifiers are two ways of referring to the same things [Boolos] |
| 10488 | It is lunacy to think we only see ink-marks, and not word-types [Boolos] |
| 10487 | I am a fan of abstract objects, and confident of their existence [Boolos] |
| 10489 | We deal with abstract objects all the time: software, poems, mistakes, triangles.. [Boolos] |
| 3570 | Maybe knowledge is belief which 'tracks' the truth [Nozick, by Williams,M] |
| 2748 | A true belief isn't knowledge if it would be believed even if false. It should 'track the truth' [Nozick, by Dancy,J] |
| 16861 | A false theory could hardly rival the explanatory power of natural selection [Darwin] |
| 22662 | In the instrumental view of rationality it only concerns means, and not ends [Nozick] |
| 22666 | Is it rational to believe a truth which leads to permanent misery? [Nozick] |
| 22667 | Rationality needs some self-consciousness, to also evaluate how we acquired our reasons [Nozick] |
| 22663 | Rationality is normally said to concern either giving reasons, or reliability [Nozick] |
| 8693 | An 'abstraction principle' says two things are identical if they are 'equivalent' in some respect [Boolos] |
| 18648 | Freedom to live according to our own conception of the good is the ultimate value [Nozick, by Kymlicka] |
| 20585 | If an experience machine gives you any experience you want, should you hook up for life? [Nozick] |
| 18643 | A minimal state should protect, but a state forcing us to do more is unjustified [Nozick] |
| 18642 | Individual rights are so strong that the state and its officials must be very limited in power [Nozick] |
| 18644 | States can't enforce mutual aid on citizens, or interfere for their own good [Nozick] |
| 22661 | My Anarchy, State and Utopia neglected our formal social ties and concerns [Nozick on Nozick] |
| 18641 | If people hold things legitimately, just distribution is simply the result of free exchanges [Nozick, by Kymlicka] |
| 20521 | Can I come to own the sea, by mixing my private tomato juice with it? [Nozick] |
| 20539 | Property is legitimate by initial acquisition, voluntary transfer, or rectification of injustice [Nozick, by Swift] |
| 18645 | Nozick assumes initial holdings include property rights, but we can challenge that [Kymlicka on Nozick] |
| 18646 | How did the private property get started? If violence was involved, we can redistribute it [Kymlicka on Nozick] |
| 18647 | If property is only initially acquired by denying the rights of others, Nozick can't get started [Kymlicka on Nozick] |
| 21737 | Unowned things may be permanently acquired, if it doesn't worsen the position of other people [Nozick] |
| 21738 | Maybe land was originally collectively owned, rather than unowned? [Cohen,GA on Nozick] |