38 ideas
22664 | I do not care if my trivial beliefs are false, and I have no interest in many truths [Nozick] |
22665 | Maybe James was depicting the value of truth, and not its nature [Nozick] |
4986 | A weaker kind of reductionism than direct translation is the use of 'bridge laws' [Kirk,R] |
3570 | Maybe knowledge is belief which 'tracks' the truth [Nozick, by Williams,M] |
2748 | A true belief isn't knowledge if it would be believed even if false. It should 'track the truth' [Nozick, by Dancy,J] |
16861 | A false theory could hardly rival the explanatory power of natural selection [Darwin] |
5001 | Maybe we should see intentionality and consciousness as a single problem, not two [Kirk,R] |
4993 | If a bird captures a worm, we could say its behaviour is 'about' the worm [Kirk,R] |
5000 | Behaviourism says intentionality is an external relation; language of thought says it's internal [Kirk,R] |
4982 | Dualism implies some brain events with no physical cause, and others with no physical effect [Kirk,R] |
4991 | Behaviourism seems a good theory for intentional states, but bad for phenomenal ones [Kirk,R] |
4994 | Behaviourism offers a good alternative to simplistic unitary accounts of mental relationships [Kirk,R] |
4992 | In 'holistic' behaviourism we say a mental state is a complex of many dispositions [Kirk,R] |
4990 | The inverted spectrum idea is often regarded as an objection to behaviourism [Kirk,R] |
4984 | All meaningful psychological statements can be translated into physics [Kirk,R] |
4998 | Instead of representation by sentences, it can be by a distribution of connectionist strengths [Kirk,R] |
4985 | If mental states are multiply realisable, they could not be translated into physical terms [Kirk,R] |
22662 | In the instrumental view of rationality it only concerns means, and not ends [Nozick] |
22666 | Is it rational to believe a truth which leads to permanent misery? [Nozick] |
22667 | Rationality needs some self-consciousness, to also evaluate how we acquired our reasons [Nozick] |
22663 | Rationality is normally said to concern either giving reasons, or reliability [Nozick] |
4997 | It seems unlikely that most concepts are innate, if a theory must be understood to grasp them [Kirk,R] |
4999 | For behaviourists language is just a special kind of behaviour [Kirk,R] |
4995 | Behaviourists doubt whether reference is a single type of relation [Kirk,R] |
18648 | Freedom to live according to our own conception of the good is the ultimate value [Nozick, by Kymlicka] |
20585 | If an experience machine gives you any experience you want, should you hook up for life? [Nozick] |
18643 | A minimal state should protect, but a state forcing us to do more is unjustified [Nozick] |
18642 | Individual rights are so strong that the state and its officials must be very limited in power [Nozick] |
18644 | States can't enforce mutual aid on citizens, or interfere for their own good [Nozick] |
22661 | My Anarchy, State and Utopia neglected our formal social ties and concerns [Nozick on Nozick] |
18641 | If people hold things legitimately, just distribution is simply the result of free exchanges [Nozick, by Kymlicka] |
20539 | Property is legitimate by initial acquisition, voluntary transfer, or rectification of injustice [Nozick, by Swift] |
18645 | Nozick assumes initial holdings include property rights, but we can challenge that [Kymlicka on Nozick] |
20521 | Can I come to own the sea, by mixing my private tomato juice with it? [Nozick] |
18646 | How did the private property get started? If violence was involved, we can redistribute it [Kymlicka on Nozick] |
18647 | If property is only initially acquired by denying the rights of others, Nozick can't get started [Kymlicka on Nozick] |
21737 | Unowned things may be permanently acquired, if it doesn't worsen the position of other people [Nozick] |
21738 | Maybe land was originally collectively owned, rather than unowned? [Cohen,GA on Nozick] |